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ABSTRACT 
 
Perpetuating Peace: Context versus Contents of the Power-sharing Agreements Between 
the KDP and PUK of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998 
By 
Brigitte E. Hugh, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2020 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Anna O. Pechenkina 
Department: Political Science 
 
 
What accounts for the breakdown of peace after the 1992 50-50 Agreement versus the 
deep institutionalization of peace after the 1998 Washington Agreement between the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraq’s Kurdistan 
Region? In this thesis, I investigate which of the two competing scholarships—the institutionalist 
versus the selection camp—has a greater explanatory power when applied to this research 
question. 
 My analysis suggests that three independent variables played the greatest role in shaping 
the observed outcomes—peace, or lack thereof—after the two agreements in 1992 and 1998. 
First, the extensive learning period through conflict allowed for discovery of the exact fighting 
power of each party and the spoiler status of Turkey and the PKK. Second, the agreement 
language, reached through the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa peace process, provides pathways for 
institutionalizing positive peace in the community. And third, the Kurds inadvertently stumbled 
on one of the best ways to maintain the peace which is their separate governorates and, most 
 iv 
importantly, the separate peshmergas, which made the end of this war more similar to that of an 
interstate war than that of a civil war, and thus allowed for a more stable arrangement. These 
three independent variables are divided into two extensive learning periods—wartime and 
peacetime learning—which in concert ultimately account for the successful establishment of 
positive peace in Iraqi Kurdistan after the Washington Agreement.  
The second period, a peacetime period following 1998, enabled the two parties to learn 
how to run a democratic government until such time as the incentives for the elites shifted in the 
wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, an event which prompted them to believe cooperation 
was the best path forward for the Iraqi Kurdish parties in the new Iraq.  
While the context informed compliance and maintenance of the agreements, the language 
of the agreements makes a difference, though not sufficient to explain peace on its own. I further 
argue that the ambiguity negotiated through the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa process into the 
structure of the Washington Agreement enabled the two parties to establish patterns of positive 
peace in their region, culminating in the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement 
in 2006.  
In summary, using a mixture of primary and secondary sources, my analysis of the case 
reveals that the success or failure of the agreements is endogenous to the context in which the 
parties choose to sign those agreements. Furthermore, the text of the 1998 agreement also 
contributes to the absence of armed conflict after 1998, as well as the incentives to deepen 
cooperation after 2003. 
 
(120 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
Perpetuating Peace: Context Versus Contents of the Power-sharing Agreements between 
the KDP and PUK of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 1992 and 1998 
Brigitte E. Hugh 
 
 
In the mid-1990s the two Kurdish parties in Iraq—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—signed two power-sharing agreements, which had 
dramatically different results. The 1992 50-50 Agreement ended in conflict while the 1998 
Washington Agreement ended in long-lasting peace. 
I examine both the agreements and their surrounding context to identify what explains the 
success or failure of these two agreements in establishing long-lasting and cooperative peace. I 
find that the presence or absence of peace is due to both the language of the agreements and the 
context in which they were created. I demonstrate this through an examination of the two 
learning periods the Iraqi Kurds experienced, one through fighting from 1994-1997 and the 
second through a peacetime separation into two governorates from 1998-2006. 
 One of the most important conclusions is that the endemic Koya/Shaqlawa peace process 
between the two Iraqi Kurdish parties prior to the 1998 Washington Agreement resulted in a 
more ambiguous agreement in 1998 which laid the ground work for greater cooperation over the 
next decade culminating in the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the mid-1990s, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), the most powerful political parties representing the Kurdish population of Iraq, 
had two sequential power-sharing agreements that attempted to end the historical conflicts 
between them which started in the mid-1970s. In 1992, the 50-50 Agreement ended with a civil 
war between KDP and PUK. In contrast, the Washington Agreement in 1998—and its 
subsequent renegotiation, the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement in 2006—
have resulted in over two decades of peace in the region. What accounts for the breakdown of 
peace after the 50-50 Agreement versus the deep institutionalization of peace after the 
Washington Agreement?  
In this thesis, I investigate which of the two competing scholarships has a greater 
explanatory power when applied to this research question. On the one hand, the “selection camp” 
puts forth that the parties strategically select themselves into an agreement based on the 
contextual learning that precedes negotiations. Therefore, agreements have no independent effect 
on peace but merely reflect the expectations of the parties that elected to sign them. On the other 
hand, the “institutionalist camp” argues that the content of agreements has an additional, 
independent impact on the durability of peace. My analysis shows that contextual factors explain 
most of why peace succeeded or failed after the signing of these agreements, but that the 
language of these agreements also contributed to deepen the peace from a negative peace (the 
cessation of hostilities) to a positive peace (depth of cooperation between the parties.)  
Analyzing the agreements brokered during the 1990s in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
(KRI) through the selection prism, one should ask: since the parties strategically selected 
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themselves into an agreement, could we attribute any subsequent peace to the language of the 
agreement itself? That is, a high degree of compliance with agreements among states (or proto-
states) is expected because the actors are voluntarily choosing to sign agreements based on their 
expectations of what arrangement can last, so agreements are merely “scraps of paper.” 1 My 
analysis indeed yields that the language of the agreements cannot be divorced from the 
circumstances in which they came about. The history, current events, and personalities involved 
are critical to understanding the impact and acceptance of the negotiations as well as the 
components of the substantive deal agreed upon.  
Relying on the selection lens, I suggest two major takeaways for how contextual factors 
shaped war and peace between KDP and PUK. The first conclusion of my case study analysis is 
that the intermittent fighting between 1994 and 1997 and the subsequent prolonged one-on-one 
negotiations from 1998 to 2006 provided two extensive learning periods during which the PUK 
and KDP discovered three important things.  
First, they were evenly matched at nearly every level even and especially with the 
assistance of international and regional governments. The expectations of the two parties as to 
who was more popular and powerful in the region were ill-informed before the 1992 deal 
because the two parties had never fought one another. This uncertainty about which side would 
prevail in a military contest muddied the waters just long enough to suggest to both parties that 
they were the more powerful actor, causing dissatisfaction with the 50-50 Agreement from its 
inception. Additionally, the PUK found flaws in the Agreement as it did not guarantee the 
transparency in the creation of the budget, and since most of the Kurdistan Regional 
                                               
1 Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?,” 370–82; 
Werner and Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” 262; Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International 
Cooperation.” 
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Government’s (KRG) money came from trade in the KDP regions, the PUK was concerned that 
the KDP might not share revenue equally, and as a result grow more powerful.  
Second, the conflict period provided time to come to understand the status of the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Turkey, and, to a certain extent, Iran as spoilers for the peace 
process between the KDP and the PUK. Prior to the establishment of the KRG, external backers, 
specifically Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, saw the Iraqi Kurdish parties as pawns to be used in 
their attacks on Baghdad. In the wake of the establishment of the KRG in 1992, Turkey and Iran, 
began to view Iraqi Kurdistan as a threat to their regional autonomy, fearing that Iraqi Kurdish 
success would incite rebellions from Kurdish minorities within their own borders. Turkey was 
already acutely aware of this possibility as their insurgent Kurdish party, the PKK, fled to Iraqi 
Kurdistan during this period. The eventual exclusion of Turkey and PKK from the negotiation 
process was a major positive development towards peace. My analysis of the case reveals that 
without the interference of Turkey and the PKK, the armed conflict between the KDP and PUK 
would have concluded far more speedily than it did. 
Third, after learning their true relative parity of power and excluding third parties with 
spoiler incentives from meddling in the negotiation process, the KDP and PUK were able to 
enter a second learning period during and after the endemic peace process which began between 
them in December 1997 and continued until June 1998. Historical accounts of this period largely 
overlook its contribution towards the US-brokered peace process in September 1998. Most 
accounts of the war simply do not mention it at all, and Stansfield 2010, the only author who 
dwells on the Koya/Shaqlawa peace process, places less weight on these early negotiations, 
emphasizing the role of the United States in the 1998 Washington Agreement. My analysis, by 
contrast, suggests that without the early groundwork laid by the Koya/Shaqlawa negotiations, the 
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Washington Agreement would not have been as reflective of the true parity between KDP and 
PUK and thus less effective for establishing and maintaining peace.  
My second major conclusion is that the deeper integration between the KDP and PUK 
started in response to the US altering incentives for these proto-states. The US invasion of Iraq in 
2003 created a major opportunity for greater regional autonomy for the Iraqi Kurdistan region; 
this external shift altered the incentives of the KDP and PUK elites and allowed for deeper 
cooperation and the emergence of positive peace as evidence by the 2006 Unification agreement. 
That is, the collapse of a more authoritarian Ba’athist regime in Iraq and the intent to establish a 
more democratic government provided an opening for the Kurds to take a more prominent role in 
Iraqi politics, and in order to do so they felt they needed to present a more legitimate and 
trustworthy face to the Iraqi government and the world writ large.  
In short, relying on the “selection” lens to analyze this case suggests that learning about 
each other and external spoilers through warfare and negotiations allowed the KDP and PUK to 
voluntarily select themselves into a 1998 deal that was far more reflective of the true distribution 
of power between them. That is, these factors largely explain the negative peace (i.e., the absence 
of warfare between them). Additionally, the US invasion of Iraq altered the incentives of KDP 
and PUK such that both sought deeper cooperation or the positive peace in order to present a 
unified front to a nascent Iraqi government and the international community, and pursued such 
through negotiations for further agreements.2  
An opposing camp argues that although circumstances engender a mutual understanding 
which allows opponents to select themselves into an agreement that reflects their expectations of 
                                               
2 For the difference between positive and negative peace, see Galtung, “Toward a Grand Theory of Negative and 
Positive Peace: Peace, Security, and Conviviality,” 92, 99; Galtung and Fischer, “Positive and Negative Peace,” 99. 
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what deal shall endure at the end of conflict, the provisions of the agreement may further clarify 
and incentivize cooperation—or lack thereof—in the case of resurgent grievances. For instance, 
agreements may specify enforcement mechanisms that foster trust and increase costs of restarting 
war.3 Additionally, agreements may reduce uncertainty about intentions behind the opponent’s 
actions, thus controlling the damage from accidental violations.4  
I examine the 1992 and 1998 deals through this lens. To be clear, a mere signing of a 
power-sharing agreement does not guarantee peace, as illustrated by the 1992 50-50 Agreement, 
plagued by disagreements about revenue sharing and misunderstandings about the true 
popularity and power of each group. Instead, what makes a difference is what types of power-
sharing provisions the sides were able to agree upon. In those cases when the parties agree on 
their mutual strength and do not fear the future (the prerequisites for successful bargaining), 
power-sharing agreements shall reflect the accurate mutual expectations of a hypothetical 
military contest, perhaps, even contributing to the emergence of positive peace—the presence of 
harmony and cooperation—by giving rise to a joint project of “we-culture” in the community.  
Examining the case through the institutionalist prism, I found that contents of these 
agreements differed dramatically. The 1992 deal was specific in outlining the governing 
structure: e.g., each of the ministries was to be staffed by a minister and deputy from opposing 
parties. By contrast, after two extensive learning periods through warfare and through one-on-
one negotiations, the 1998 deal was purposefully ambiguous in reference to the executive 
structure, that ambiguity allowed for separate, parallel governorates, and separate parallel armies 
for the KDP and PUK. The second deal also included a built-in ability to renegotiate and 
                                               
3 Fortna, “Scraps of Paper?,” 342. 
4 Fortna, 342. 
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continue to alter the agreement as deemed necessary which was crucial to creating enduring, 
positive, and institutionalized peace.5 Therefore, contrary to the expectations of the 
institutionalist literature, the more specific deal failed while the more ambiguous one survived.  
Does it mean that the contents of these agreements had no effect on the subsequent war 
and peace? The evidence suggests that this variation in the chosen language of the agreements is 
easily explained by the events preceding each deal. Therefore, my major conclusion is that the 
context surrounding these agreements influences and aids the language of the agreements when 
explaining the outcomes of war and peace between the KDP and PUK. Nonetheless, the strategic 
ambiguity and the creation of renegotiation mechanism played a necessary, but not sufficient, 
role in shaping the eventual readiness of the KDP and PUK elites to deepen their cooperation 
when the US upended the political order in Iraq.  
In summary, using a mixture of primary and secondary sources, my analysis of the case 
reveals that the success or failure of the agreements is endogenous to the context in which the 
parties choose to sign those agreements. That is, the contextual variables mostly explain the 
presence of active conflict after 1992 and its absence after 1998, as well as the incentives to 
deepen cooperation after 2003; additionally, the text of the Washington Agreement also 
contributed to the deepening of cooperation post-1998.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
5 “Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement,” January 21, 2006. 
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Scope Conditions 
 
The two Kurdish Parties are not recognized by the United Nations as states. This raises 
the question of the scope conditions that my findings have for other cases of postwar peace. 
Structurally, these actors are operating as proto-states, that is each controls a specific territory, 
regulates the population residing there, enjoys the monopoly of force to tax the population, and 
deploys the taxed resources for its protection from challengers—thus, according to Wagner’s 
(2000) definition of a state, both the KDP and the PUK are unrecognized states.6  Given that both 
sides still keep their standing armies (“peshmerga”), the end of the armed conflict between them 
resembles that of an interstate war rather than a civil conflict, in which one side is expected to 
disarm. Thus, the findings from this case study could apply to weak states that are not regional 
powers and, thus, are susceptible to influence by outside actors.  
Additionally, the Kurds represent a rare case of the same ethnic group being divided by 
political conflict. In this sense, this case is similar to Vietnam and Korea. Both south Asian 
countries were divided by an internecine conflict plagued by the influence of powerful global 
and regional external actors. The example of Iraqi Kurdistan can provide some insights as to how 
a thoughtfully created power-sharing agreement can provide a pathway towards reunification in 
the future for ethnic groups similarly plagued by conflict.  
 
 
                                               
6 Wagner, “Bargaining and War.” 
 8 
Case Selection: Why the Kurds of Iraq?  
 
The KRI has been an independently administered region in northern Iraq since 1992 
characterized by a power-sharing government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), 
between the two dominant parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK.) The region has been relatively peacefully run by these coexisting, but 
politically opposed parties since a ceasefire in 1997 and the subsequent Washington Agreement, 
a power-sharing agreement brokered in 1998. This peaceful period followed an initial (failed) 
power-sharing agreement (50-50 Agreement) which was established after elections in 1992 and 
ended when an armed conflict erupted between the two parties in 1994.7  
The KRI is not a state, and most, if not all, theories on the topics of war and 
peacebuilding are developed to examine state level interactions. Application of these theories to 
the KRI is justified because of its unique situation as a fairly robust, state-like entity in the region 
with complicated party systems, elections, and functional government which often outperforms 
the national government of Iraq. Gareth Stansfield notes that the Iraqi Kurds have been afforded 
the opportunity to run a fairly autonomous region for so long that their structures have aspects of 
state characteristics which make it a good candidate for study using theories usually applied to 
states.8 Additionally, the Kurds developed the first modern regional government in Iraq which 
had democratic characteristics, making it an all the more interesting topic for study.  
                                               
7 Jameel, “A Case Study of Political Corruption in Conflict-Affected Societies (The Kurdistan Region of Iraq 2003-
13),” 77–78, 80; Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-
2000,” 222–23; Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 48; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and 
International Relations, 190, 192; Gunter, “The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq,” 233; Gunter, “Kurdish 
Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 33–34; Makovsky, “Kurdish Agreement Signals New U.S. Commitment.” 
8 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, 13. 
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The Kurdish situation is even more intriguing for a study of power-sharing agreements 
because the parties signed two similar agreements within a short period of time, one ending in 
war and the other bringing long-lasting peace. These contrasting outcomes of seemingly similar 
agreements present a puzzle that merits study.  
Furthermore, an endemic process for peace negotiations began in 1998 and while 
formalized by the 1998 Washington Agreement, these negotiations did not simply end. There has 
been at least one formal renegotiation that ended in a signed deal between the parties in 2006—
the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement—which further integrated and 
formalized the executive relationship between the two major parties.9 
 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is organized as the following. The first chapter presents a brief history of the 
Kurdish Region of Iraq. The second chapter reviews the pertinent political science literature on 
why peace succeeds or fails. With this background, I begin my analysis of the conflict between 
the Kurdish parties. I analyze the impact of the context leading to, and the language of, the 
                                               
9 A note about spelling and terms 
English transliterations of certain Kurdish proper names have many different spellings. In the interest of consistency, 
I have chosen one spelling for some of these words:  
• Erbil: also known as Irbil, Arbil, Hawler, and Hewler 
• Sulaymaniyah: also known as Sulaimaniya, Slemani, Suleimaniyah 
• Masoud Barzani: Ma’sud Bar’zani (leader of the KDP) 
• Dohuk: also known as Duhok 
• Koya: also known as Koysanjaq, Koye 
• Shaqlawa: also known as Seqlawe 
Certain terms are found to have different iterations across the literature. In the case of the 50-50 Agreement (1992), 
it is referred to as the 50-50 deal and the 50-50 system across different analyses and histories.  
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agreements (the independent variables) on the presence and quality of peace (the dependent 
variables) after the 50-50 Agreement (1992) and the Washington Agreement (1998). The final 
chapter discusses the contribution of this project to our understanding of why the 1998 
agreement survived while the 1992 agreement failed.  
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I 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE  
KURDS IN IRAQ (1941-1998) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Iraqi Kurdistan in 199810 
                                               
10 “Atlas of Iraqi Kurdistan - Wikimedia Commons.”, map edited by the author 
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1941-1958—Organizing the Kurdish Revolutionary Spirit in Iraq and Iran 
 
Summary 
 Starting in the 1940s, the Iraqi Kurds, alongside their Iranian counterparts, worked to 
create parties that brought several tribes together. In Iran, this culminated with the short-lived 
Kurdish Republic of the Mahabad. In Iraq, this period of organization was characterized by the 
formation of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and various revolutionary activities against 
the Iraqi government that resulted in Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s expulsion from Iraq. During the 
decade of Mulla Mustafa’s exile, the KDP engaged in infighting. 
 
 
Timeline of Events  
The Kurds found in the northern part of Iraq have engaged in extensive revolutionary 
activity against the governments that have nominally controlled their territory. Until the 1940s 
this activity had taken place in loosely cooperative tribal configurations, but in the wake of the 
Treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923)—which included the first promises of autonomy 
for Kurdistan region before stripping that hope away—the Kurds in Iraq began to bring the tribes 
together into larger party-like groups.11  
The first real party was founded underground by Rafiq Hilmi in 1941, it was called the  
Hiwa12 (Hope) party. Membership in the party spanned the political spectrum from left to right 
among the Kurdish urban intellectuals, but did not manage to draw in rural membership which 
                                               
11 Hannum, “Chapter 9: The Kurds,” 183–84. 
12 Also spelled “Heva” 
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proved to be its weakness. It collapsed in 1945 paving the way for the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP.)13  
The current status of politics in Iraqi Kurdistan stem from one main figure, Mulla 
Mustafa Barzani,14 a member of the highly revered Barzan clan, who rose to prominence during 
the 1940s. Due to revolutionary activities, Mulla Mustafa was placed under house arrest by the 
Iraqi government in 1941 and escaped two years later in 1943.15 At that time, Mulla Mustafa 
fomented a rebellion against the Hashemite Iraqi King.16 The “Barzani Rebellion” continued for 
another two years until Mulla Mustafa was forced to flee to Iran in 1945.17 
While in Iran, Mulla Mustafa was party to the establishment of the Kurdish Democratic 
Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. In September 1945, Qazi 
Mohammad, leader of the Iranian Kurds, and other officials established the Kurdish Democratic 
Party of Iran in preparation to declare the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in northwest Iran on 
December 15, 1945. The Republic was a relatively short-lived experiment in autonomous rule 
lasting only one year, but it provided a blue print for future Kurdish autonomous movements.18  
 
                                               
13 Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 138; Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, 9. 
14 Due to the sheer number of Barzani’s which will populate this history, Mulla Mustafa Barzani will hereafter be 
referred to as Mulla Mustafa.  
15 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 16. 
16 “Kurdish Nationalism in the Middle East,” 2. 
17 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 16. 
18 Roosevelt Jr., “Chapter 4: The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,” 140–42, 182; Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the 
Kurds, 192–93. 
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Figure 2: Map of Kurdish Republic of Mahabad and Autonomous Republic of 
Azerbaijan, 1945-194619 
  
 
                                               
19 “Atlas of Iraqi Kurdistan - Wikimedia Commons.” 
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During this time, on recommendation from Mulla Mustafa, and modeled after the KDPI, 
the Kurdish Democratic Party (later renamed the Kurdistan Democratic Party)20 was formed in 
Iraq on August 16, 1946, with Mulla Mustafa elected president in absentia. The party was 
formed from the remnants of four previous parties, including the Hiwa party.21 
After the fall of the Mahabad Republic, Mulla Mustafa and his troops were forced to 
withdraw to the Soviet Union, in what has been termed the “Retreat of the Five Hundred,” where 
they remained until 1958.22 During Mulla Mustafa’s Soviet exile, the Kurds and the Iraqi 
government did not engage in skirmishes or battles, passing a relatively quiet decade. However, 
there was quite a bit of internal political struggle between factions of the KDP.  
Shortly after the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, Ibrahim Ahmed, a progressive 
socialist, joined the KDP in Iraq and took on a leadership role in the party, in which he leveraged 
his organizational know-how to get the KDP off the ground as a functional party. Ahmed 
provided the structure while Mulla Mustafa’s name and affiliation provided the legitimacy the 
party needed to establish itself.23  
In 1951, Ahmed was elected the secretary general of the KDP, a party which, partly due 
to his influence had come to be dominated by the intelligentsia.24 During this period, Ahmed and 
Hamza Abdullah (Mulla Mustafa’s representative in the party) and their respective factions often 
                                               
20 Aziz, The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan, 67; Gunter, Historical 
Dictionary of the Kurds, 190–91. 
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struggled with one another with regard to the overall goals and policies of the KDP.25 The 
struggle between Ahmed’s leftist faction and Barzani’s traditionalist faction would continue 
within the KDP until 1975 when the parties split, which will be discussed later. Not only was this 
a struggle between ideas, but it is said that when Ahmed and Mulla Mustafa met in 1958, Mulla 
Mustafa seemed to take an immediate disliking to Ahmed, demonstrating interpersonal friction.26 
 
 
1958-1970— Iraqi/Kurdish Collaboration turned to the Kurdish “War of Liberation” 
 
Summary 
 Though the period of Iraqi Kurdish history starting in 1958 began with a promising 
collaboration between a new Republic of Iraq and the KDP that brought Mulla Mustafa back to 
Iraq, that cooperation only lasted until 1961. Baghdad’s attacks on the Kurdistan region 
prompted the launch of the “War of Liberation” which saw five total Kurdistan Wars, four of 
which took place between 1961 and 1970.  
 
Timeline of Events 
In July 1958, Abdul Karim Qassim,27 an Iraqi army officer, not a Kurd, overthrew the 
Iraqi monarchy and proclaimed the Republic of Iraq.28 Because his campaign was supported by 
                                               
25 Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 190. 
26 Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men, 123. 
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the KDP, Qassim legalized the party and welcomed Mulla Mustafa back to Iraq in October 1958, 
where he assumed the position of KDP president in person.29 However, this cooperation with the 
new republic was short lived as Qassim attempted to assert his authority through military 
dictatorship and did so by attacking other political parties. In 1960, his efforts turned towards the 
Kurds and on September 9, 1961 these efforts culminated in air bombardment against 
Kurdistan.30 
Qassim’s actions in 1960 and 1961 prompted the Kurdish Revolution of 1961 which 
launched the longest and most sustained period of military and political engagement against the 
Iraqi government in the history of Kurdish movements, also known as “The War of Liberation.” 
The revolution sought to gain some measure of autonomy and freedom from the Iraqi 
government and lasted until 1975.31  
However, even leading into this period of conflict, the KDP was witnessing infighting. 
By 1960, the KDP Politburo, the leftist faction led by Ahmed and Ahmed’s son-in-law Jalal 
Talabani, only recognized Mulla Mustafa’s leadership out of political necessity and their 
infighting often precluded even their resistance against the bombardment from Baghdad.32 For 
the first three months of the struggle against Qassim which started in 1961, Ahmed and 
Talabani’s KDP Politburo refused to take part. It wasn’t until December of 1961 that they 
stepped up their efforts.33 
                                               
29 Aziz, The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan, 69; Gunter, Historical 
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The Great Kurdish Rebellion (1961-1963), or the Second Kurdistan War, came to an end 
when the Ba’ath party eliminated Qassim and signed a cease-fire with Mulla Mustafa, which he 
signed before consulting the KDP Politburo and ultimately led to increased distrust.34 Following 
this action, both KDP factions expelled each other, and then reunited until their permanent 
divorce in 1975.35 Meanwhile, the ceasefire between the Kurds and the Ba’ath party was short 
lived. After internal fighting, the Ba’athist factions which originated the coup, reestablished the  
Iraqi Republic, this time under the rule of President ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif.36 The ceasefire ended 
in 1965 after the president of Iraq launched a spring offensive against the Kurds. The Third 
Kurdistan War would continue until June 15, 1966 when a new ceasefire was reached.37 
On July 17, 1968, a revolution in Baghdad brought the Tikriti Ba’athists to power again, 
this time for a tenure that would see the rise of Saddam and stay in power until 2003.38 
Following the Ba’athist ascension to power, a Fourth Kurdistan War was launched in April 
1969.39 In 1970, the Ba’athist party, headed by Saddam, approached the Iraqi Kurds—at this 
time still a seemingly unified KDP—to build a peace agreement. 
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1970-1975—March Manifesto, Law of Autonomy, the Fifth Kurdistan War, and Party 
Splintering 
 
Summary 
 Saddam’s negotiations with the Kurds in 1970 enabled the KDP to draft the best 
agreement ever offered to the Kurds, the March Manifesto. For four years, the Kurds were 
granted de facto autonomy by Baghdad, until 1974 when they were presented with a watered-
down version of the March Manifesto, The Law of Autonomy. The KDP rejected the latter and 
again fought Baghdad in the Fifth Kurdistan War. When Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers 
Agreement in 1975, Iran withdrew their support of the Kurdish rebellion, which led to its 
collapse. As the rebellion crumbled, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) splintered from the 
KDP. 
 
Timeline of Events 
In effect, vice president Saddam Hussein gave the Kurdish parties carte blanche to design 
a satisfactory peace agreement between the Iraqi government and themselves in 1970.40 The 
resultant March Manifesto (March Agreement) was the best deal ever offered to the Kurds in 
Iraq, allowing them autonomy over their region in Northern Iraq, Kurdish as an official language 
in Iraq, Kurdish education and culture reinforced, and Kurds involvement in all levels of 
government, etc.41 The agreement, though never fully implemented, temporarily suspended a 
                                               
40 Anderson and Stansfield, Gareth R. V., The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?, 166. 
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decade of conflict which had resulted in 60,000 casualties for both the Kurds and the Iraqi 
Government as well as displacing 300,000 people, mostly Kurds.42  
The period that followed, from 1970-1974, has been referred to as a “golden era” for the 
Kurds in which they were largely left untouched by the central government in Baghdad and were 
able to learn the skills of local administration and direct governance which provided them a 
foundation on which to build when they would be afforded this opportunity again in 1991.43 
However, by 1974 Baghdad had concluded that it could not accept the full terms of the 
March Manifesto and drafted a watered-down version of the agreement, the Law of Autonomy 
(Act 33 of 1974) which was presented to Mulla Mustafa without prior approval or agreement 
from the KDP.44 Mulla Mustafa was expected to comply within 15 days. Instead, he prepared to 
fight, drawing 60,000 peshmerga and 60,000 irregular fighters into the Fifth Kurdistan War with 
90,000 Iraqi forces.45  
At the beginning of this conflict, the Kurds were supported by the Iranians, but the 
conflict ended after the March 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq in which Iran 
agreed to withdraw their support from the Kurds.46 Without Iranian support, the Kurdish front 
ultimately collapsed, and with it the formalized conflict between the government and the Kurds 
which began in 1961 ended.47 Following the end of conflict, Mulla Mustafa fled to America for 
treatment of his cancer, where he would stay until his death in 1979.48  
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In Mulla Mustafa’s absence, as well as the shadow of failed revolution, the internal 
struggles between the leftist coalition and the more conservative coalition of the KDP came to a 
head and the party splintered into several pieces. At this time, Mulla Mustafa’s two sons, Idris 
and Masoud Barzani formed the KDP/Provisional Command (which would retake the name KDP 
in 1979), and Jalal Talabani, Ahmed’s protégé, formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).49 
These two parties endure as the main political influences in Iraqi Kurdistan today.  
 
 
1975-1991—Kurdish Infighting, Chemical Attacks, and the Iraqi Kurdistan Front  
 
Summary 
 In the few years following 1975 and before the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, 
the PUK and the KDP engaged in an intense power-struggle to become the dominant Iraqi 
Kurdish power. However, as the war began, both parties saw it as their opportunity to assert 
power in the Northern part of Iraq and waged parallel but separate attacks against Baghdad. In 
1987, Tehran brokered an agreement between the two Kurdish parties that led to the 
establishment of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front in 1988, just as Iraq began the Anfal campaign, a large 
anti-Kurdish military operation that included the use of chemical weapons (the most notable 
attack occurred in March 1988 at Halabja.)  
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Timeline of Events 
During the first years of reorganizing the Kurdish parties following the disastrous fallout 
from the Fifth Kurdistan War, the PUK and KDP were engaged in an intense power-struggle 
which was often backed by external actors and consisted of guerrilla warfare. Between 1975 and 
1979, more effort was committed to fighting each other for power than was expended towards 
fighting the regime as had been done in the past.50  
 As the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980, both Kurdish factions saw it as an opportunity to 
assert their own hold on the northern part of Iraq and force the government to grant meaningful 
autonomy. In doing so, each retained alliances: the KDP with the new Iranian government 
headed by Khomeini and the PUK rotated through several alliances during the war, Syria, Iraq 
and finally Iran.51  
 During the war, there were multiple popular Kurdish uprisings in 1982, 1984, 1985, and 
1987 which were leveraged by the Kurdish parties, though never in cooperation, in order to 
strike out against the Iraqi government.52 In 1983, the Ba’ath government worked with the PUK 
to sign a ceasefire in an effort to stop the KDP’s coordinated attacks with the Iranians. Instead of 
stopping the attacks, this only further polarized the Kurdish national movement.53 
 From 1985 to 1988, the Kurdish movement effected the most sustained pressure against 
the government since the 1975 collapse.54 As a result, the Iraqi government perpetuated large-
scale genocidal acts in 1988 to keep the Kurds in check. In 1987, ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid was 
                                               
50 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 161–64; Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish 
Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 222; Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical 
Perspective,” 30. 
51 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 170–71. 
52 Bengio, 172. 
53 Bengio, 172. 
54 Bengio, 172. 
 
 23 
declared the absolute ruler of the north by Saddam and perpetuated a chemical punishment 
campaign against the Kurds which became known as the Anfal campaigns.55 From February to 
September 1988, the eight stages of the Anfal campaign resulted in large scale chemical weapons 
attacks, physical destruction of villages, and the transfer of Kurds out of the Kurdish 
heartlands.56  
 However, it was the Halabja Massacre in March of 1988 that earned ‘Ali the nickname 
“Chemical Ali.” Halabja is one of the single most important events to the Iraqi Kurds and is 
sometimes described as “Hiroshima of the Kurds” as it is the largest chemical warfare attack 
since World War I. In one day, some 5,000 civilians of all ages were killed or wounded by a 
chemical cocktail made up of four kinds of gas including mustard and sarin.57 Halabja became a 
large affair because, unlike the rest of the chemical attacks, Iranians witnessed and reported the 
attack providing evidence to the world of the attacks on the Kurds.58  
In part due to the increased antagonism from the Iraqi government, and also out of 
necessity, the PUK and KDP established a tolerance for one another and both initiated actions 
against the government without interference from the other party in the late 1980s.59 By 1987, 
Iran was supporting both Kurdish parties and managed to bring them together and help them 
develop a working relationship. In July, the KDP, PUK, and four smaller parties announced the 
Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF), which was formally established in May 1988. The IKF had little 
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consequence during the 1980s but gave the impression of unity and later played an important 
role when it came time to organize the autonomous region in 1991. 60 
 
1991-1998—Establishing and Fighting Over an Autonomous Region  
 
Summary 
 In the early 1990s, the KDP and PUK parties continued to maintain a tenuous alliance 
that, in the wake of the US establishing a no-fly zone, extended to the development of elections 
for an autonomous region. However, this cooperation ended in 1994 when armed conflict ignited 
between the two parties and continued intermittently for the next four years, in what has been 
called the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War.  
 
Timeline of Events 
This tenuous relationship continued from 1987 until 1994, even as the United States 
established the no-fly zone over northern Iraq in 1991 after the first Gulf War. The third-party 
enforced no-fly zone afforded the Kurds in Iraq a unique and exciting opportunity to develop 
their own governance system free from military interference from Saddam who was preoccupied 
trying to maintain control and rebuild the rest of Iraq in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and the 
First Gulf War.61  
In 1992, the KRI held its first general election. Largely seen as free and fair by the 
outside world it resulted in an extremely close margin between the two parties: the KDP received 
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50.22 percent and the PUK received 49.87 percent of the vote to allocate seats within the 
Kurdistan National Assembly. The margin between the two presidential candidates was even 
closer.62 Because both parties were so close in every measure of power and the margin was so 
small for election results, they came to a power-sharing agreement which split all power almost 
directly down the middle. This did require that the KDP give up some power, but on the whole, 
the outcome gave equal amounts of control to both sides. However, this 50-50 Agreement did 
not prevent conflict between the two parties for long. For reasons that will be discussed at length 
in this thesis, the two Kurdish parties were engaged in a low-intensity, but prolonged conflict 
with one another by 1994.63  
After three years of conflict and attempted negotiations, the conflict ended in 1998 after 
extensive negotiations brokered by the United States. The Washington Agreement, signed by the 
leaders of the KDP and the PUK in September of 1998, re-established the cooperative Kurdish 
National Assembly (KNA) and because of the ambiguous language, led to two executive seats of 
power each administered by one party.64 This power-sharing agreement was later renegotiated in 
2006 such that the executive branch was once more unified and included some measures for 
ensuring the continued power-sharing of the two parties within the branch.65  
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II 
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE BARGAINING  
APPROACH TO WAR AND PEACE 
 
  
To understand why peace succeeds or fails, one must first understand why wars begin. 
The bargaining approach suggests that the recipe for war is a grievance between two parties 
accompanied by a bargaining failure. Grievances exist long before war breaks out and thus 
cannot be the cause of war. The bargaining failures that lead to war—the information problem 
and the commitment problem—are often the same problems that lead to a breakdown of peace.66  
 In the information problem, one or both parties have incentives to misrepresent their 
capabilities or resolve in order to achieve a better deal. This problem leads to war when one or 
both sides mistakenly believes that they can prevail in a war. In peace, the information problem 
can lead to a resurgence of war for similar reasons, i.e. if at least one party is overly optimistic 
about its relative strength or resolve.67 
 The commitment problem is a situation in which the two sides are unable to settle on a 
mutually beneficial bargain today because the relative power in the dyad could shift in such a 
way that creates incentive for at least one side to renege on today’s deal in the future.68 In civil 
wars this problem is particularly acute since rebel actors are often required to disarm as a 
prerequisite for civil war settlement: by giving up their military leverage, rebels will become 
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vulnerable to government reneging tomorrow on its own promises of amnesty today.69 The 
commitment problem undermines peace when relative power is shifting such that one side has 
the potential to grow rapidly (due to the development of specific weapons or acquisition of 
strategic territory, for instance). This anticipated unfavorable shift in power puts the growing 
side in a position to demand more or renegotiate the present-day bargain in the future, which 
makes war today more attractive for the relatively declining opponent.70 
 Given this explanation of the bargaining approach to war, I explore the situation between 
the Kurdish parties. The conflict is referred to as the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War; however, it is not a 
traditional civil war in which there are power asymmetries between a state and rebel group. At 
the time of the conflict, the PUK and the KDP were relatively well-matched with respect to 
resources and international backers.71  
At the time that conflict began, the two biggest cities were under the control of opposite 
parties, the PUK in Sulaymaniyah and the KDP in Erbil, in effect splitting the territory and the 
population in half. Additionally, there wasn’t a “state” power or a “rebel” power because the two 
parties began the conflict during the process of developing a functional regional government for 
the first time.72 As a result, this conflict does not meet the definition of a typical civil war; 
nonetheless, I will be using the label "Kurdish Civil War” as that is what it is called in the 
historical record.  
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I posit that the commitment problems often found in civil wars—that the stronger power 
has no incentive to respect the terms of the peace agreement once the weaker group’s military 
forces have disbanded—is not present in this case, in part because even in 2020 the parties still 
control their own separate peshmergas,73 so there is no commitment problem that could stem 
from either party’s fears of disarmament. Thus, the decision to keep separate peshmergas after 
1998 has been helpful for maintaining peace between the two parties as it makes the end of this 
conflict more akin to an interstate war than a traditional civil war.74 Even in 2010, when moves 
were finally made to combine the peshmergas, it was to create Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) 
which are joint PUK-KDP units of about 40,000 peshmerga fighters each, and are in addition to 
the party units.75   
 
 
Fighting is Learning 
 The general bargaining framework has spawned many explanations for why peace 
endures and what circumstances will ameliorate the information and commitment problems that 
could otherwise lead to the recurrence of war. I will explore four of these more thoroughly: 
aspects of the war process; third party influence; and peace agreements, in two categories—those 
that provide uncertainty reducing measures and those that implement peace institutionalization 
measures.  
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War Process 
 Some scholars, part of the “selection camp” argue that there are features of the war 
process which correlate with the durability of peace. Since absolute wars, or wars that end in 
complete destruction of one combatant, are relatively few, Wagner posits that warfare itself 
represents a bargaining process as it helps identify parameters for negotiation, so that most wars 
end as limited instead of absolute wars.76  
Werner further argues that the demands made by groups are often strategically calculated 
such that they expect they can receive a redistribution of goods through negotiation or through 
conflict, if necessary.77 Werner points out that war is also part of the renegotiation process when 
one side perceives that they might be able to gain more from a settlement by re-entering conflict, 
or when the underlying issues for a conflict were not resolved by the previous outcome because 
peace was imposed too early by an external party to adequately solve the bargaining problems.78 
Smith and Stam argue that long wars with consistent fighting ameliorates the information 
problem which initially led to war due to the revelatory nature of conflict—each battle fought 
reveals more information about the true capabilities of either side of the conflict.79 Slantchev 
argues that wars terminate only when fighting or negotiations reveal enough information that 
they are able to coordinate expectations about the results each party expects to receive at the end 
of conflict.80 Fearon and Smith and Stam additionally argue that wars that are long and/or have 
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high casualties are much less likely to recur because the costs were so high the first time and 
revealed information which was not available prior to the conflict.81 
 In the case of the Kurds of Iraq, the duration and intensity of war process cannot account 
for the fragility of post-1992 peace because there was no conflict between just those two parties 
before 1994; however, the duration of the war can account for the durability of peace post-1998. 
The PUK and KDP had been arguing on and off since 1975, when the parties initially split, but 
had not ever fought one another. This means that by 1992—when the 50-50 Agreement was 
signed—the PUK and KDP would not have been aware of each other’s capabilities.82 The 
decision to fight was then based in part on a mutual optimism on both sides that they could 
defeat the other in combat as they had both been largely effective in waging attacks on Iraq 
during the Iran-Iraq war.83 
Estimates for the total number of fatalities during the Kurdish Civil War range from 
2,000 to 5,000 during the three years of combat (1994-1997), with most sources agreeing it was 
probably closest to 3,000. 84 On average then, the Kurdish Civil War fits the definition for war 
from the Correlates of War project which specifies that there must be a total of at least 1,000 
battle deaths during each year, an effective resistance, and commitment from both sides of the 
conflict.85 However, it barely reaches the level to qualify as a war, so that necessarily disqualifies 
this conflict from the argument that high casualties preserve the peace.  
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The length of the war does provide a compelling argument here for the peace 
maintenance. While three years may not seem like a long, drawn-out conflict, the Iraqi Kurdish 
civil war came on the heels of almost 50 years of non-stop conflict with the government in 
Baghdad. 86 Three years seems to be all that was necessary for the two parties to reveal the 
information which had been unknown before the war.  
 
Third-party Involvement  
Third parties often shape war and peace, and are usually associated with the 
“institutionalist camp” as they try to create the circumstances in which a peace could hold. Third-
party involvement occurs at two key stages: (i) before the inception of peace through 
pressure/coercive mediation87 and (ii) after the peace was achieved through peace guarantees or 
spoiling. When external actors raise the costs of war through threats of punishment or promises 
of benefits in exchange for peace, they expand the bargaining range, making peace a more 
attractive option even in the presence of bargaining failures. Often, pressure for peace has a 
short-term impact because in most cases third-party attention ultimately wanes and the costs they 
imposed dissipate,88 though there are some notable exceptions, e.g. the US keeps the peace 
between Israel and Egypt through strategically allocating economic and military aid.89  
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Coercive mediation, or manipulation, as defined by Beardsley et al., is the process of a 
mediator increasing immediate costs of continuing conflict and the future costs of reneging.90 In 
cases of coercive mediation, agreements are often accepted more out of concern for the penalties 
that could be imposed than satisfaction with the terms of the agreement. Thus, belligerents are 
more likely to return to conflict after coercive mediation or pressure for peace than in the 
“organic” cases where external parties did not pressure for peace during fighting.91  
The peace process between the two Kurdish parties was long and arduous, but while 
mediators were attempting to facilitate most of those talks, coercive measures were not used. 
Additionally, the two parties were able to fight until they converged in mutual expectation of 
parity enough that they started their own peace process, the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings.92  
Walter shows that civil wars in particular rarely end with a peace agreement due to the 
need for an agreement guarantor, an external party which will remain active to ensure 
compliance by both parties. Different from, but sometimes in addition to, coercive mediators in 
that they don’t manipulate the terms of the agreement, instead they ensure that both parties 
continue to abide by the agreement made. Guarantors eventually tend to lose interest in 
maintaining an agreement, and when they do, the chance for conflict reignition is highly likely.93  
For the Iraqi Kurds, there was no designated agreement guarantor. The US and Turkish 
embassy officials visited Kurdistan on June 10, 2000, almost two years after the signing of the 
Washington Agreement at which time the two parties reaffirmed their commitment.94 However, 
                                               
90 Beardsley et al., “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes,” 64. 
91 Werner and Yuen, “Making and Keeping Peace,” 270; Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?,” 288; 
Pechenkina, “Third-Party Pressure for Peace,” 1. 
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in Iraq,” 134–36. 
93 Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” 335–36; Beardsley, “Agreement without Peace? 
International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems,” 723. 
94 Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 230. 
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this was the only time the US or another party played any role in the Kurdish conflict which 
could approach guarantor. 
Aside from being a guarantor or coercive mediator, a third party can take on the role of 
facilitator for peace talks. Facilitators must be invited to aid in an agreement and as such do not 
exert any pressure on belligerents, but once there, they serve as a channel of communication 
among the parties. For a long time, facilitative mediation had been viewed as fostering peace by 
revealing all options available to the belligerents; 95 however more recent work has exposed that 
facilitative mediators cannot make the belligerents (without resorting to pressure) reveal the 
information that the latter prefer to hide.96 This means that facilitative mediation cannot 
precipitate peace: in the cases where facilitative mediation coincides with ceasefire, the 
belligerents were ready to settle.  
For the Iraqi Kurds, the US, Turkey, Iran, and the UK all served as facilitators for some 
part of the peace process between the PUK and the KDP. With respect to the Washington 
Agreement, the US played the role of facilitator given that the Koya/Shaqlawa Meetings during 
February-June 1998 laid the groundwork for the peace process between the KDP and PUK, after 
which the US facilitated the final agreement, which would be impossible without the long one-
on-one negotiations between the KDP and PUK.97  
The presence of peacekeepers keeps the costs of fighting high while they are present, 
often, though not always, as a function of an agreement guarantor. Peacekeeping works to 
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lengthen negative peace when most other attempts to keep the peace have already been made.98 
Iraqi Kurdistan hosted several different groups of de facto peacekeepers, but most were not 
present to keep the peace between the KDP and the PUK. The UN Guards Contingent in Iraq, 
Operation Provide Comfort peace keepers, and Oil-for-food administrators were all present to 
prevent Baghdad from attacking the Kurds, not to prevent the KDP and the PUK from fighting 
each other.99 Once, in 1996, Turkish peace enforcers were tasked with maintaining a peace 
agreement between the two parties, but they did not prevent armed conflict from recurring.100  
Finally, third parties can serve as spoilers for peace, attacking in an effort to convince the 
enemy that the moderates who support them are untrustworthy in an attempt to disrupt peace 
talks.101 The Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) served as a classic spoiler for the peace process 
between the Iraqi Kurdish parties at least once, when they attacked the KDP in order to break up 
peace talks in 1995.102 
 
Provisions of Peace Agreements (Non-power-sharing) 
 Still other scholars, those squarely in the institutionalist camp, argue that it is the contents 
of peace agreements which make the difference between recurrence of war and the endurance of 
peace. Fortna demonstrates that agreements which include measures that alter the incentives of 
breaking the agreement—such as formal cease-fire agreements, peacekeeping forces, creation of 
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demilitarized zones, withdrawal of forces, etc.—lengthen the peace and lessen the likelihood of a 
return to conflict by increasing the cost of return war and reducing the uncertainty about 
intentions and actions (information problem.) 103 
Mattes and Savun come to a similar conclusion—carefully constructed peace agreements 
prevent the recurrence of war by mitigating the information problem. However, Mattes and 
Savun focus more on third-parties which serve as agreement guarantors as the mechanism which 
can ensure that parties do not return to war.104  
In examining the effects of non-power-sharing aspects of peace agreements, the selection 
camp points out that the simple absence of conflict (negative peace) is not evidence that an 
agreement has made a difference because the parties elected to sign the agreements and thus 
likely would have maintained peace regardless. To argue that the agreement made a difference, 
one must demonstrate evidence of observable effects which could not have been predicted when 
the parties signed the agreement.   
 In the case of the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War, the Washington Agreement itself did not 
include any of the conventional mechanisms tested by Fortna, and Mattes and Savun. There was 
a ceasefire, negotiated in 1997, but it was not necessarily a part of the Washington Agreement, 
and did not set up a formal demilitarized zone.105 Additionally, arms control and peacekeepers 
were not present as part of the Washington Agreement. Although international troops were in the 
region due to various humanitarian campaigns, they were not there to maintain the peace and 
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ensure compliance with the agreement.106 This means that conventional peace agreement 
measures are unlikely to account for the length of the peace post-1998. Additionally, while the 
Washington Agreement was brokered with the aid of the United States, they did not play the role 
of agreement guarantor, meaning the United States did not serve as an enforcing power to ensure 
compliance of the parties with agreement stipulations. 
 
Institutional Power-sharing Agreements (Consociationalism)  
 Consociationalism—the brokering of power-sharing agreements as a solution for ending 
civil wars—focuses on ameliorating the commitment and information problems on an ongoing 
basis after the conflict has concluded by creating a system of governance in which both parties 
get a measure of control commensurate with their strength and are required to work together in 
the business of governing.107 In essence, a power-sharing agreement captures many, if not all, of 
the mechanisms Fortna discusses which decrease the likelihood of war, such as altering 
incentives, reducing uncertainty about actions and intentions, and controlling fallout from 
accidental violations.108  
Hartzell argues that power-sharing agreements address the concern that one party will 
ultimately gain control of a greater portion of power as the institutions are built or rebuilt.109 
Furthermore, Hartzell and Hoddie demonstrate that the more diverse the power-sharing 
agreement across sectors—usually political, economic, territorial, and military—the more 
                                               
106 Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 286; Katzman and Blanchard, “Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, Illicit 
Trade, and Investigations.” 
107 Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy,” 509–36; Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”; Selway and 
Templeman, “The Myth of Consociationalism? Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies.” 
108 Fortna, “Scraps of Paper?,” 342. 
109 Hartzell, “Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars,” 7. 
 
 37 
enduring the peace will be.110 Therefore, power-sharing agreements—as their proponents 
argue—do not simply formalize the arrangements that otherwise would have been reached by the 
two sides of the conflicts (as the selection camp would argue), but influence the outcome and 
likelihood of a return to conflict (as the institutionalist camp would suggest.) 
 Aziz argues that power-sharing agreements create conditions in which all parties are at 
least partial winners, reducing the perception that elections and democratic entanglement is a 
zero-sum game for a slightly weaker party.111 However, Aziz notes that power-sharing 
agreements serve first to end violence, they do not then place emphasis on building 
democracy.112 Aziz is not alone in this assessment of power-sharing agreements, most theorists 
that study the effectiveness of power-sharing agreements for establishing peace, which is defined 
as the cessation of armed conflict, or, negative peace, agree with him. What goes unexamined is 
the ability for power-sharing agreements to foster collaboration between the combatant parties, 
or establishing positive peace. The situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is all the more interesting because 
their power-sharing agreements were geared towards achieving greater democracy within their 
region, and the outcome of this agreement has been a deepening collaboration between the PUK 
and KDP.  
 Gareth Stansfield posits that consociational theories can be used to analyze the reasons 
behind the political instability in Iraqi Kurdistan in the early 1990s and the subsequent stability 
of the later 1990s.113 Stansfield argues that in the short term, the natural division between the 
party’s administrative regions has created an ideal situation, but that further rapprochement may 
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not be successful given the internal competition and the external pressures against Kurds gaining 
power. However, he does suggest that slow moving unification is not only a possibility but a 
necessity for maintaining peace long-term.114  
 Both these arguments rest on an understanding of power-sharing agreements as powerful 
in their own right, uninformed by the context in which they are created. Stansfield then misses 
the selection argument, in which case the Kurdish parties might have maintained peace without 
unification, or may have created a fast-moving unification because they select in to agreements 
they eventually sign.  
 Stansfield isn’t alone in this disregard for the selection argument. Most power-sharing 
theorists seem to fall more in line with an institutionalist perspective. But in order to show that 
these agreements have some sort of independent impact we have to show that there is evidence 
of effects that were not anticipated when the original agreements were signed.  
  In the case of the Kurds, we can see that the 50-50 Agreement which did not allow for 
renegotiation and provides no opportunities for the parties to experience deeper collaboration 
between them, or adjustment of the agreement according to changes in their context, is not 
successful given the outbreak of war in 1994. As such, it is possible that the purposefully 
ambiguous language of the Washington Agreement also contributed towards preserving negative 
peace and deepening a ceasefire into positive peace.  
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III 
CASE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Analytical Approach 
This thesis uses a qualitative, within-case study of cooperation (or lack thereof) between 
KDP and PUK that followed two cases of peace agreements (both power-sharing). This within-
case variation (armed conflict after the 1992 agreement and long-term peace after the 1998 
agreement) allows me to compare the effects of my independent variables (1) contextual factors, 
e.g., the costs imposed by third parties, the duration and intensity of warfare, and (2) the 
provisions of these agreements, ambiguity in the exact integration of structures, on my dependent 
variables (1) the presence or absence of peace (negative peace) and (2) the quality of cooperation 
(positive peace).  
The advantage of within-case analysis lies in comparison of how the outlined 
independent variables shaped war after 1992 and peace after 1998 without having to account for 
the possible effects of different governing parties, cultures, and other variables which could 
impact a cross-case analysis. In addition, a within-case study requires that the previous 
agreements, once examined as texts, become context for future agreements.  
Table 1 lists the independent variables whose impact this study examines. The three 
columns separate the events of 1992 vs. 1998 vs. 2006—the three years during which major 
agreements between the PUK and KDP were reached. Each row in Table 1 outlines an 
independent variable. Table 1 first lists the context-related independent variables: humanitarian 
campaigns, regional influences, military maneuvers, and active foreign forces in the region. 
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Table 1 also includes a breakdown of content-related independent variables, i.e., the agreement 
components present in (or absent from) the 1992 50-50 Agreement, the 1998 Washington 
Agreement, and the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement. 
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Table 1: Power-sharing Agreements in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
 50-50 Agreement (1992) Washington Agreement (1998) 
Kurdistan Regional 
Government Unification 
Agreement (2006) 
Actors PUK/KDP PUK/KDP PUK/KDP 
Context-related independent variables115 
Negotiated by/with a 
third-party No Yes No 
Regional Influences Iran and Turkey Iran, Turkey and the Kurdistan 
Worker’s Party (PKK) 
Iran and Turkey 
Humanitarian Campaigns 
Operation Provide Comfort 
(OPC) (1991-1996) 
Operation Northern Watch 
(1996-2003) 
Operation Northern Watch (1996-
2003) 
Oil-for-Food Program (1995-
2003) 
Oil-for-food program (ends 
in 2003) 
Military maneuvers 
No-fly zone (Operation Poised 
Hammer) (1991-2003) 
PKK/Turkey conflict in KRG 
(1987-1999) 
No-fly zone (1991-2003) 
PKK/ Turkey conflict (1987-1999) 
US invasion of Iraq (2003) 
Foreign forces active in 
region 
UN Guards Contingent in Iraq 
(UNGCI) (1991-2003) 
OPC forces (1991-1996) 
 UNGCI (1991-2003) 
Turkish peace enforcers (1996) 
OPC forces (1991-1996) 
UNGCI (1991-2003) 
Oil-for-food administrators 
(1995-2003) 
                                               
115 Information drawn from: Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds; Brown, Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991 With Marines in Operation 
Provide Comfort; “Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan: Human Rights Developments”; Nader et al., “Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan”; Gunter, “The 
United Nations and the Kurds”; Mays, Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations; 
Charountaki, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government”; Charountaki, The Kurds and US Foreign Policy; Gibson, “The Secret Origins of 
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Oil-for-food administrators (1995-
2003) 
US and coalition forces 
(2003-) 
Content-related independent variables116 
Party Leadership 
involvement No Yes Yes 
Opportunity for 
Integration  No Yes Yes 
Communication between 
parties Yes Yes Yes 
Judiciary structure N/A N/A N/A 
Executive structure 
Office of president never 
activated 
Ministries split 50/50 between 
the parties 
Language in the agreement 
ambiguous, ultimately settled with 
two executives 
 
Unification of ministries, 
Position: Vice President 
created 
Legislative structure 
50/50 split in the seats, leftover 
5 to the minority parties 
Assembly structure un-dictated, 
elections mandated 
Unchanged as to structure, 
Speaker and PM given party 
mandates & rotation 
schedule 
Financial control Not given to the government Single Minister of Revenue and 
Taxation 
Yes, regional budget to be 
prepared by the unified 
KRG. Ministry of Finance to 
unite w/in a year 
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Military control Not given to government Powers given to government to 
unify, action still un taken 
Ministry of Peshmerga to 
unite w/in a year  
Elections Unmandated Mandated N/A 
Police N/A N/A 
Supreme commission to be 
established to institutionalize 
policy and security agencies 
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The Events of 1992 to 2006 to be Analyzed 
 
 From 1992 to 2006, the Kurds in Iraq were involved in a long series of events, 
outlined in Table 3, that comprised both conflict (section 3.3.1) and peace processes 
(section 3.3.2). There were nearly as many peace-building events as there were conflict 
events between the two parties and outlining the full chronology of what happened in 
1992-2006 helps identify how the context informed the agreements and how the 
agreements informed the context.  
 
1992-1994—Iraqi Kurdish Elections and Collaboration 
 
The establishment of the no-fly zone in 1991 created an environment relatively 
free of Saddam’s influence, so the Kurdish parties in northern Iraq agreed to hold 
elections to establish an autonomous Kurdish government. The elections took place in 
May 1992, and despite being run by a people who were relatively unfamiliar with 
democratic traditions, they were remarkably free and fair.117  
The results of the parliamentary election did not fit the expectations of either 
party. The KDP who had expected to get upwards of 70 percent of the vote, ended up 
with 50.22 percent. Meanwhile, the PUK had expected to receive 55 to 60 percent of the 
vote and received 49.78 percent.118 Furthermore, the election numbers for president, a 
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race between Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, were too close to call and required a 
second round of voting in order to select a president, but second round voting never took 
place.119  
 In the wake of these disappointing election results for all, the Kurdish Front set 
about negotiating and developed the 50-50 Agreement in an effort to keep the fledgling 
democracy alive. 120 As part of the agreement, the PUK and KDP each received 50 seats 
in the 105-seat Kurdish National Assembly (KNA), and the remaining five were allocated 
to the Assyrian Christian minority.121 At the time of announcement of the 50-50 
Agreement, Barzani and Talabani said that “the elections were a victory for everyone.” 
However, later Talabani admitted that no one was truly satisfied with this outcome.122  
As part of the 50-50 Agreement, the KDP was required to share revenue with the 
PUK. Due to the geographic positioning of the two parties, the KDP controlled the 
lucrative border crossing with Turkey, which brought in between $100,000 to $150,000 
per day accounting for 85 percent of the KRG’s revenues.123 Due to Iraqi sanctions on the 
Kurdistan region, much of this was illicit. The PUK was less advantageously positioned 
on the Iranian border, which was not as involved in trade with Iraq, illicit or otherwise. 
Therefore, the most available income for the Kurds in Iraq at this time was the border 
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money from trade with Turkey, and to a lesser extent the foreign assistance programs in 
the region.124  
This collaboration between the two parties even extended to a joint offensive with 
Turkey against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)—the Turkish Kurdish rebel group—
which was hiding in the Iraqi Kurdish territory. Turkey began the offensive on October 
16, 1991, and the PUK and KDP joined on October 21, for the relatively short-lived 
campaign. The PKK later surrendered to the Iraqi Kurdish Front, more specifically the 
PUK on October 30.125 
 
1994-1995—Conflict and Broken Peace Talks 
 
In May of 1994, after much complaining about the KDP withholding funds, and 
some increased dispute about land ownership, the PUK attacked.126 For one month the 
KDP and PUK fought, resulting in more than 400 killed and the KDP seizing Dohuk, 
Zakho, and Ammadiya from the PUK. 127 After this initial fighting, they instituted a brief 
(merely hours long) ceasefire, before clashes resumed lasting until June 6. During these 
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clashes, more than 600 people were killed. 128 On July 4, 1994, the KDP and PUK 
announced that they were still unified against the Iraqi Government despite their clashes. 
129 In part, however, these clashes may have been started because Baghdad was no longer 
a unifying foe as US enforced safe haven kept Baghdad out of the Kurdish territories and 
removed them as an active joint enemy to keep the PUK and KDP in cooperation with 
one another.130  
Shortly after the announcement, France, the UK, and the US made their first 
attempts to broker peace between the KDP and PUK in Paris from July 16-22, 1994. Two 
factors prevented the Paris Peace talks from brokering an agreement.131 First Turkey, 
upset about global power’s intervention into their region without involving them, and 
reluctant to let a Kurdish state develop, refused Talabani and Barzani the exit visas they 
needed to go to Paris to sign the accords.132 Second, clashes once again broke out 
between the PUK and the KDP beginning on July 19, 1994.133 
Clashes continued until August 15, 1994, when the PUK and KDP reached a 
ceasefire, but it was short-lived with clashes starting again less than 72 hours later on 
August 17. 134 They tried again on November 21, 1994 and reached the “Alliance Pac” or 
the “Year 2000 Agreement” wherein they agreed not to fight until the year 2000; 
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however, this agreement lasted only until December 13, 1994 when another dispute over 
tax collection sparked further conflict. During this round of fighting, the PUK captured 
the village of Kasnazan near Erbil (the Iraqi Kurdish seat of government) and then 
managed to take Erbil from the KDP on January 1, 1995. 135 Fighting continued until 
February 17, 1995 when an informal cease fire between the PUK and the KDP ended 
fighting for a few days until heavy fighting resumed from February 20-22. 136  
On the eve of the Kurdish New Year (Nowruz137), Turkey launched Operation 
Steel, a military operation which attacked the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan on March 20, 1995. 
138 This operation lasted until May 4, and, in the middle of that offensive the PUK and 
KDP clashed for four hours on March 27, 1995 resulting in 10 deaths. On April 8, 1995, 
the KDP called for a temporary truce with the PUK, brokered by Turkey. 139 Turkey’s 
withdrawal from Iraqi Kurdistan in May was short lived as they launched another 
offensive against the PKK from July 4-11, 1995. During Turkey’s latest offensive the 
PUK began to be wary of the KDP, which had been working with Turkey and launched a 
preemptive attack on July 8, 1995. 140  
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Late 1995—The Drogheda Talks  
 
In June 1995, an US State Department official visited Iraqi Kurdistan to invite the 
parties to talks in Ireland sponsored by the US, UK and Turkey.141 From August 11-15, 
1995 the parties participated in the first session of the Drogheda talks, during which a 
preliminary agreement was reached. However, the content was the same as had been the 
meat of other agreements which had failed because interpretations varied between the 
parties as to the meaning of certain clauses; in particular those concerning revenue 
sharing—the PUK’s ongoing concern over KDP’s monopolization of the Kurd’s main 
source of income along the Turkish border—and the KDP’s demands that the PUK end 
military occupation of Erbil.142   
In the midst of negotiations, the PKK attacked the KDP on August 26, 1995 in an 
effort to break up the peace talks taking place in Ireland. The PKK knew that if the PUK 
and the KDP were able to reach an agreement, their safe haven would be compromised 
since the attention of the Kurds in Iraq would not be divided, and they would then be in a 
position to remove the PKK from their territory.143 Combined with language which did 
not address the true conflicts, the second negotiation period from September 11-15 failed 
to secure an agreement of any kind.144   
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After the Drogheda talks failed, Iran invited the Kurdish parties to Tehran in 
October 1995 to reach an agreement. While there are reports that an agreement of some 
sorts was reached, the reports are unclear as to the nature of the agreement, and on the 
whole, nothing came of it.145 US sponsored peace talks resumed on November 13 and 
21,1995, but they also ended without reaching an agreement.146 The US tried again on 
April 18, 1996, when they sent US State Department official Robert Deutsch to Northern 
Iraq to try to broker a settlement, but no agreement was reached.147 
 
1996—Saddam’s Involvement in the Conflict  
 
On August 16, 1996, the PUK broke the relative peace between the two parties 
and attacked the KDP. As a result, the KDP turned to Saddam for support on August 22, 
1996.148 On August 28, the PUK and KDP agreed to a new US brokered ceasefire and 
further agreed to work towards a more comprehensive settlement. However, this only 
lasted until August 31, when the Iraqi forces arrived to aid the KDP in the fight against 
the PUK.149  
It is with this support that the KDP was able to retain control of Erbil, which they 
had lost in early 1995, and further took the PUK stronghold of Sulaymaniyah on 
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September 9. The support of the Iraqi fighting forces was technically in violation of 
UNSC Resolution 688, and the safe haven established by the US and allies, resulting in 
US strikes in the south of Iraq.150 On October 13, the PUK, with assistance from Iran, 
took back Sulaymaniyah and two other small towns just prior to the 10-point Agreement, 
a ceasefire brokered by the US and Turkey on October 2. The agreement returned the 
ceasefire line to the precombat location between Degala and Koysanjaq in the first of the 
Ankara Process negotiations. 151   
 
1996-1997—The Ankara Process 
 
The Ankara process was a series of peace negotiations brokered in Turkey by the 
US, UK, and Turkey in October 1996, and January, March, and May 1997.152 In the 
midst of these talks, on May 14, 1997, 50,000 Turkish troops invaded Iraqi Kurdistan to 
wage Operation Sledgehammer against PKK camps in northern Iraq. 153 On July 10, the 
PUK withdrew from the Ankara process citing Turkish involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan 
and including bias towards, and support for, the KDP. 154 
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Starting in September 1997, the PKK and KDP fought resulting in considerable 
losses for KDP.155 Then, on September 23, the Turkish army in cooperation with the 
KDP attacked the PUK in a campaign known as “Operation Twilight.”156 The operation 
ended on October 13, and Turkish troops withdrew, but on the heels of Turkish 
withdrawal, the PUK launched a military campaign against the KDP known as the 
“Storm of Revenge” or “Operation Vengeance Storm.”  
The campaign continued for five days and was supposed to conclude on October 
18 after the US brokered a ceasefire; however, the signing of the agreement was followed 
by some skirmishes in which members of both sides were killed. 157 Fighting continued 
between the PUK and the KDP even when the KDP declared a unilateral ceasefire on 
November 24. 158  
 
1998—The Koya/Shaqlawa Process and the Washington Agreement 
 
In December of 1997 and January of 1998, the two Kurdish leaders, Talabani and 
Barzani, begin trading letters which served as the foundation for an endemic peace 
process between the two parties known as the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings.159 Historical 
records indicate that increased Turkish and PKK involvement frustrated the two parties 
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and they realized that their conflict was being manipulated by both parties for their own 
benefit; the PKK so as to keep their safe haven and Turkey so it could continue to attack 
the PKK. 
 On February 12, 1998 this peace process began in earnest when delegations from 
both the KDP and the PUK met in Shaqlawa, the first of a series of meetings which took 
place every two weeks with the location rotating between Shaqlawa in KDP territory and 
Koysanjaq (Koya) in PUK territory. These meetings worked to develop confidence 
building measures between the two parties including prisoner exchanges, enforcing the 
ceasefire, ending media attacks and establishment of a joint committee to ensure 
implementation of SCR 986 (oil-for-food).160 However the talks deadlocked over the 
main issues of territory, revenue-sharing, and military in June of 1998 at which time the 
meetings became much less frequent.161  
In July, the US sent State Department official David Walsh to Kurdistan to invite 
the two parties to a final set of negotiations meant to create a comprehensive peace 
settlement. Using the Koya/Shaqlawa agreements as a baseline, the Washington talks 
developed a power-sharing agreement which included measures addressing the knotty 
issues that had deadlocked the previous talks. In the company of US Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright, Talabani and Barzani announced the signing of the Washington 
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Agreement on September 17, 1998, ending a three-year conflict that resulted in 2,000-
5,000 casualties on either side.162   
While the Washington Agreement is on paper a power-sharing agreement meant 
to unify the two parties, it was in practice a robust ceasefire agreement, at least at first. 
The PUK and KDP ultimately had different governorates which they controlled  and 
governed separately until the 2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification 
Agreement. Both parties also maintained their own peshmergas.163 However, even a 
veneer of cooperation and a halt to military combat through the Washington process, 
enabled them to keep Turkey, the PKK and Iran out of their affairs for a time because of 
US protection. In doing so, this period where both parties were administering their own 
regions was helpful when unification occurred because there were double the number of 
civil servants with experience to lend to the process.164 
 
1999-2003—Challenges to the Washington Agreement 
 
Almost immediately upon the PUK and KDP signing the Washington Agreement, 
the PKK moved back into Iraqi Kurdistan territory, which put a strain on the agreement 
since both parties had agreed not to provide any support to the PKK.165 The PKK 
                                               
162 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, 
Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 229; Refugees, “Refworld | Chronology for Kurds in Iraq”; 
“Timeline”; Hampson and Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention, Appendix 4.1; “Turkey and Iraqi 
Kurds.” 
163 Dodge, Iraq’s Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change, 51; Stansfield, “From Civil War to Calculated 
Compromise: The Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq,” 131–39. 
164 Stansfield, “Governing Kurdistan: The Strengths of Division,” 199, 204. 
165 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 67. 
 
  
55 
presence continued to be a problem for implementation of the Agreement even after 
Turkey captured Öcalan, the leader of the PKK in February 1999,166 because Barzani 
accused the PUK of helping the PKK in April of 1999.167 
Even without the added tension from the PKK, the parties continued to meet to 
implement the agreement, and hold each other responsible for non-implementation, as the 
PUK did in June 1999.168 On June 10, 2000 the PUK and KDP reaffirmed their 
commitment to the Washington Agreement when US and Turkish embassy officials 
visited Iraqi Kurdistan.169 
Over the course of the next few years, the two parties operated their separate 
regions, but would jointly participate in many initiatives and projects, including a joint 
operation room to address terrorism in the region,170 a coalition with other Iraqi groups 
on the future of Iraq in the event of a US-led military intervention,171 a joint federal 
project in September 2002 that drew Turkish attention and warning,172 the Kurdistan 
National Assembly resuming,173 and the opening of offices in each other’s regions as a 
sign of reconciliation on February 8, 2003.174  
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2003-2006—The US Invasion: The Kurds and a new Iraq 
 
From 2000-2003, the US continued to be very involved with the Iraqi Kurds. 
Including Kurdish leaders meeting with several high-ranking US officials: Vice President 
Al Gore in June 2000, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in November 2000, and 
President George W. Bush in April 2002.175 On August 15, 2002, Talabani even issued a 
public invitation to the US and the UK to invade Iraq from PUK territory.176 And both the 
KDP and PUK announced their intention to join the US invasion forces in the war on Iraq 
on February 15, 2003; there was once again a reason to coalesce against a greater 
enemy.177 Many scholars point to the US invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003 as crucial in 
the process of normalizing relations between the PUK and the KDP.178 
Post-2003 the US seems less involved in Kurdish affairs, and more involved in 
Iraqi governmental affairs writ large, organizing the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), and successors, the Iraqi Governing Council and the interim Iraqi Government.179 
As such, the US does not seem to apply any undue pressure for the KDP and the PUK to 
unite their governorates.  
Instead, this seems to come as a result of a Kurdish codification in the Iraqi 
constitution as one regional governorate with reasonable independence, and the need to 
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be perceived as strong by their counterparts in the Iraqi government as well as the 
international onlookers.180 The announcement of a unified KRG came mere weeks before 
the announcement of a permanent Iraqi government—one on May 7, 2006 and the other 
on May 20.181 While the US did not put any pressure on the Iraqi Kurdish parties towards 
unification, the 2003 invasion laid the groundwork for their eventual unification.             
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Table 2: Peace Negotiations in Iraqi Kurdistan (1987-2006) 
Dates Name Initiating 
party 
Most recent 
conflict 
Immediately 
following 
conflict 
Turkey UK US Other 
country 
Agreement 
type 
7/1987 Kurdistan 
Front 
Iran 1987 Popular 
Kurdish 
uprising 
against Iraqi 
Government 
1990 uprising 
against Iraqi 
government 
 N N N Iran Fighting 
Coalition 
against Saddam 
Hussein 
1992 50-50 
Agreement 
KDP-PUK N/A PUK attacks 
5/1994 
N N N N Power-sharing 
peace agreement 
7/16-
22/1994 
Paris Peace 
Talks 
US/UK 5/3/94 KDP 
takes Dohuk, 
Zakho & 
Ammadiya 
7/19-8/18/94 
sporadic 
clashes 
between 
parties 
Yes—
doesn’t 
allow 
visas for 
Kurdish 
leaders to 
sign 
agreement 
Y Y France 
(host)  
Peace 
Agreement 
8/15/94 N/A PUK/KDP Ongoing 
clashes since 
8/18/94 
8/17/94 N N N N Ceasefire (lasts 
less than 72 
hours) 
11/21/94 Alliance pact 
(Year 2000 
agreement)  
PUK/KDP 8/17/94 12/13/94 N N N N Ceasefire/peace 
8/11-
15/95 
Drogheda talks US, State 
dept 
7/8/95 PUK 
preemptive 
8/26/1995 
PKK attacks 
KDP to break 
Y Y Y Ireland 
(host) 
Preliminary 
Agreement 
reached 
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official 
visits 6/95  
attack on 
KDP 
up peace 
talks 
9/11-
15/95 
Drogheda talks  US 8/26/1995 
PKK attacks 
KDP to 
break up 
peace talks 
None 
recorded 
before next 
peace talks 
Y Y Y Ireland 
(host) 
None reached 
10/95 N/A Iran None 
recorded 
between 
peace talks 
None 
recorded 
before next 
peace talks 
N N N Iran Unclear from all 
reports 
11/13-
21/95 
N/A US None 
recorded 
between 
peace talks 
None 
recorded 
before next 
peace talks 
N N Y 
(sponsor) 
N None reached 
4/18/96 N/A US None 
recorded 
between 
peace talks 
8/16-31/96 
Erbil taken 
by KDP with 
help from 
Iraqi Forces 
N N Y (Robert 
Deutsch 
goes to 
Kurdistan) 
N N/A 
10/23/96 10-Point 
Agreement, 
first phase of 
Ankara process 
US 10/13/96 None 
recorded 
before next 
peace talks 
Y N Y  N Ceasefire 
1/16/97-
3/11/97 
Ankara Process US None 
recorded 
between 
peace talks 
3/16/97 KDP 
official 
murdered, 
PUK denies 
responsibility 
Y N Y N Ankara 
declaration 
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5/97 Ankara process 
continued 
US 3/11/97 KDP 
official 
murdered  
7/10/97 PUK 
withdraws 
from Ankara 
Process 
Y N Y N None reached 
2/12/98 Koya/Shaqlawa 
Meetings 
PUK/KDP 10/13/97 
Storm of 
Revenge 
N/A N N N N Meetings—> 
confidence 
building 
measures 
9/17/98 Washington 
Agreement 
US 
(following 
Koya-
Shaqlawa 
Meetings)  
N/A N/A N N Y N Power-
sharing/ceasefire 
1/8/99 N/A PUK/KDP N/A N/A N N N N Implementation 
meeting 
6/10/2000 N/A PUK/KDP  N/A 9/14/2000 
PUK and 
PKK fight 
Y N Y N US and Turkish 
Embassy 
officials visit 
Kurdistan, 
KDP/PUK 
reaffirm 
commitment to 
Washington 
Agreement 
9/23/2002 N/A PUK/KDP N/A N/A N N N N Publish draft 
joint federal 
project 
2/8/2003 N/A PUK/KDP N/A N/A N N N N KDP and PUK 
open offices in 
60 
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each other’s 
regions 
12/1/2004 N/A PUK/KDP 3/20/2003 
US invasion 
of Iraq 
N/A N N N N PUK and KDP 
sign agreement 
to participate in 
Iraqi elections as 
allies 
1/21/2006 N/A PUK/KDP N/A N/A N N N N 
 
KNA reaches 
agreement to 
reunify the 
divided KRG 
administration 
5/7/2006 Kurdistan 
Regional 
Government 
Unification 
Agreement  
PUK/KDP N/A N/A N N N N Unification 
agreement 
added to 1998 
agreement.  
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Analyzing the Case through the Selection and Institutionalist Prisms 
 
 Having outlined the events of 1992 to 2006, this section presents the qualitative 
examination of these events pursuing the overarching research question of this thesis: what can 
account for the failure to institutionalize peace after the 1992 50-50 Agreement versus the 
cultivation of positive peace after the signing of the Washington Agreement in 1998.  
 My analysis suggests that three independent variables played the greatest role in shaping 
the observed outcomes after the two agreements in 1992 and 1998. First, the extensive learning 
period through conflict allowed for discovery of the exact fighting power of each party and the 
spoiler status of Turkey and the PKK. Second, the agreement language makes a difference as it 
provides pathways for institutionalizing positive peace in the community. And third, the Kurds 
inadvertently stumbled on one of the best ways to maintain the peace which is their separate 
governorates and, most importantly, the separate peshmergas, which made the end of this war 
more similar to that of an interstate war than that of a civil war, and thus allowed for a more 
stable arrangement. These three independent variables are divided into two extensive learning 
periods—wartime and peacetime learning—which in concert ultimately account for the 
successful establishment of positive peace in Iraqi Kurdistan after the Washington Agreement. 
 
Extensive combat learning period  
  
The first independent variable I examine is the duration of warfare which allowed the 
sides to learn their relative military capabilities and resolve. The lack of prolonged engaged 
warfare between the KDP and the PUK before 1992 and the experience of intense fighting in 
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1994 to 1997 influenced the failure of the 1992 agreement and shaped the duration of peace after 
1998, because warfare allowed the sides to learn about each other’s military strength as well as 
to learn about the intentions and resolve of their international backers as spoilers rather than 
supporters of the peace process.  
 
Evenly matched groups (Stalemate)  
 Prior to 1992, the KDP and PUK did not directly engage in skirmishes with one another. 
There was always a greater foe, Baghdad, which drew the attention and violence of the two 
parties. There was animosity between them, as seen by their reticence to create an alliance to 
fight their common enemy on top of years of internecine disagreement. Towards the end of the 
Iran-Iraq conflict they briefly teamed up in the Iraqi Kurdish Front which allowed them the 
coalition to create the Kurdistan Regional Government in 1992.182  
However, because the two parties never engaged directly with one another after they split 
in 1975, they did not have a clear understanding of each other’s fighting strength in 1992. Their 
long-standing animosity for each other without direct military engagement in combination with 
their experience engaging militarily with Baghdad created “mutual optimism” for war in 1994.183 
Because both parties had only fought the Iraqi government pre-1992, the agreement did not meet 
any of their expectations. This was especially true with respects to the popularity they expected 
to enjoy at the ballot box, given that reports and interviews indicate the PUK expected to win 
between 55 and 60 percent of the vote while the KDP expected to receive 70 percent and the 
smaller parties affiliated with the Kurdish Front also expected to do better than they did.184 Thus, 
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both sides miscalculated expecting to prevail in armed conflict rather than compromising under 
the 50-50 Agreement.  
Engaging in skirmishes for three years with various international backers—the PUK most 
often enjoying support from Iran, the PKK and Syria (for a short time), while the KDP enjoyed 
support from Turkey and Baghdad185—informed the two parties that they were relatively well 
matched on every level militarily.186 The PUK’s Operation Vengeance Storm in October 1997 
was the final showcase for understanding that the two parties could not defeat each other, even 
with the aid of international backers.187 Additionally, the conflict over the three years had simply 
been a tit for tat. The PUK would seize territory only to have the KDP take it back in the next 
offensive, and vice versa. In short, in a post-war Iraqi Kurdistan, the two parties understood their 
limitations and they were able to reach an agreement that more fully fit their expectations. 
 
Peace Spoilers (Turkey, PKK, Iran)  
 The extensive fighting period also provided an opportunity for the PUK and KDP to 
come to understand the role that Turkey, the PKK, and Iran played as spoilers in their peace 
process. Prior to 1992, the support from outside backers was both plentiful and welcome in the 
fight against Baghdad.188 As a result, support for the parties during the conflict was not only 
normal, it was expected. It took time for both parties to learn the ulterior motives that Turkey—
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who was heavily involved in Kurdish matters189—and to a certain extent Iran—as the other, less 
involved regional power190—had in supporting either of the Kurdish parties.  
 In the wake of the Iran-Iraq war, and still trying to build a new identity as the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Iran was less involved in Iraqi Kurdish affairs than it had been in the past. But 
it, along with Turkey, was still invested in whatever came of the Kurdish struggle in Iraq given 
that an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan would have ripple effects among the Kurds in Iran.  
This section presents the major pieces of evidence that demonstrate that Turkey, PKK, 
and Iran were not interested in a peace settlement between KDP and PUK. 
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Turkey 
Table 4 presents the peace talks which took place between the Kurdish parties between 
1987 and 2006, with specific reference to Turkey’s involvement. The most salient conclusion 
from this table is that agreements in which Turkey was involved were less successful. While 
those where Turkey was not a key player, such as the Koya/Shaqlawa, Washington Agreement, 
and Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement were able to establish lasting peace.  
 
 
Table 3: Turkish Involvement in the Iraqi Kurdish Peace Process 
Dates Name Turkey 
7/1987 Kurdistan Front N/A 
1992 50-50 Agreement N/A 
7/16-22/1994 Paris Peace Talks Y 
8/15/94 N/A N 
11/21/94 Alliance pact (Year 2000 agreement)  N 
8/11-15/95 Drogheda talks Y 
9/11-15/95 Drogheda talks  Y 
10/95 N/A N 
11/13-21/95 N/A N 
4/18/96 N/A N 
10/23/96 10-Point Agreement Y 
1/16/97-3/11/97 Ankara Process Y 
5/97 Ankara process continued Y 
2/12/98 Koya/Shaqlawa Meetings N 
9/17/98 Washington Agreement N 
1/8/99 N/A N 
6/10/2000 N/A Y 
9/23/2002 N/A N 
2/8/2003 N/A N 
12/1/2004 N/A N 
1/21/2006 N/A N 
5/7/2006 Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement  N 
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 However, Turkey became much more involved in the affairs of the Kurds of Iraq during 
the 90s and in the middle of the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War because its own Kurdish insurgents—
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), formed in 1978191—were at this point taking refuge in the 
Kurdish run territories in Iraq. Their presence in Iraq informed Turkey’s motivation to be the 
staging ground for Operation Provide Comfort—the US-led effort to provide humanitarian 
assistance to the Kurds—as it gave them free reign to go after the PKK. The US’s attention was 
focused on providing aid and they were reliant on Turkey’s good will for the continuation of 
their operations, a circumstance Turkey took advantage of quite frequently.192 The first and last 
of these efforts to wipe out the PKK to take place before the Washington Agreement with the 
assistance of both the PUK and the KDP was an offensive against the PKK in October of 
1992.193  
 At least once during the Iraqi Kurdish Wars, an action taken by Turkey prevented the 
signing of a peace agreement that could have ended the war early on. During the 1994 Paris 
Peace talks, the Turkish Government did not allow Talabani and Barzani the necessary visas to 
go and sign the accords, in part because Turkey was frustrated with powers such as the US and 
the UK getting involved in their region.194  
 But Turkey’s involvement was not limited to this overt attempt to subvert the peace 
process. It was involved with almost all the peace talks after Paris and before the Washington 
Agreement (see Table 4), to the extent that it hosted the Ankara Process talks during 1996 and 
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1997.195 During one such negotiation period in May of 1997, Turkey sent 50,000 Turkish troops 
into northern Iraq to attack some PKK strongholds.196 This was an overt demonstration that they 
were not committed to the peace talks they were trying to broker.  
 In fact, when Talabani and the PUK withdrew from the process later that summer 
Talabani said, “The Ankara negotiations were foiled on 14 May because of the Turkish-Barzani 
collusion and their agreement to invade Iraqi Kurdistan on the pretext of chasing terrorists.”197 
Talabani’s statement further demonstrates how Turkey served as a spoiler for peace. At a time 
when the country was supposedly serving as an unbiased broker for peace, Talabani notes that 
“Turkey has discarded its neutral role and is now an ally of Barzani.” 198 To which Barzani 
retorted that the PUK and the PKK “have made an alliance.” 199  
 
PKK 
  The PKK served as a similar spoiler for peace due to their presence in the region, which 
was a direct effort to take advantage of the tumult in a majority Kurdish region. The PKK often 
allied itself with the PUK, as noted by Barzani, but this effort was often passive on the part of the 
PUK, which simply allowed the PKK to exist in its territory, but not did provide or receive 
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support from the PKK.200 For a time in the early 1990s, the PKK even allied itself with Baghdad, 
its every action geared towards survival.201 In August 1995, the PKK launched an attack on the 
KDP with the express purpose of spoiling the Drogheda talks which were taking place between 
the KDP and the PUK in Ireland and were initially promising.202 They did so in an effort to 
maintain their safe haven in Iraqi Kurdistan, which would have disappeared had the PUK and 
KDP achieved peace because every agreement included provisions which would have ended any 
cooperation between the PKK and the PUK. Their worries were well founded as the Washington 
Agreement did strip the PKK of their safe haven.203 
 
Iran 
 Iran and the Kurds have a long relationship before the Kurdish conflict. Most of Iran’s 
direct involvement and support for the Kurds came during the 1980s when the two Kurdish 
parties were still trying to (re)establish their reputations after the 1975 split. Iran’s eagerness to 
support both parties was a result of the Iran-Iraq war, for which Iran saw the two parties as useful 
proxies.204  
                                               
200 Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 31; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International 
Relations, 153–55, 160, 166, 191,; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 216, 232,; Gunter, 
“Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan: Their Influence on Neighbouring States and the Kurdish Movements in 
Surrounding States,” 74; “Turkey and Iraqi Kurds,” 1, Footnote 1. 
201 Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations, 171. 
202 Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 31; Jarrah, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Peace Talks Fail”; Balik, 
Turkey and the US in the Middle East: Diplomacy and Discord during the Iraq Wars, 86; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - 
Timeline”; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State, 216; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and 
International Relations, 191; Gunter, “Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan: Their Influence on Neighbouring States and 
the Kurdish Movements in Surrounding States,” 67. 
203 “Text of the Accord Signed by KDP and PUK Leaders in Washington.” 
204 Entessar, “The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations.” 
 
  
70 
 This relationship somewhat changed after the war, there was no need for Iran to be as 
involved in Kurdish affairs, but it did maintain good relationships with both parties even 
establishing the first offices in the newly established Kurdistan region in 1993.205 However, Iran 
also has a substantial population of Kurds, and the establishment of an autonomous region in 
Northern Iraq was as concerning to them as it was to Turkey. Thus, Iran’s involvement in 
tripartite talks between themselves, Syria, and Turkey to try and prevent an autonomous 
Kurdistan from 1992-1995.206 Meanwhile, Iran was one of the PUK’s most consistent, if quiet, 
backers as a counterweight to Turkey’s backing of the KDP.207 Direct Iranian involvement in the 
Kurdish conflict came only one time when they hosted peace talks in 1995 after the Drogheda 
talks failed.208 
 
KDP and PUK strive to overcome the spoilers’ influence 
It was the PUK’s Operation Vengeance Storm in late 1997 after Turkey’s withdrawal 
from Operation Sledgehammer that served as the final wake-up call to the two parties as the 
Turkish backing of the KDP showed just how easily a regional power could involve itself in 
Kurdish affairs.209 Additionally, the two parties recognized on a strategic level that unity (or at 
least a show of it) would be better than letting their division serve as a way for regional powers 
to get involved in their affairs.210 It was after the close of this offensive that they started their 
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endemic peace process in the form of the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings followed by the Washington 
Process which excluded Turkey as part of the peace process, eliminating them as a biased 
broker.211  
My analysis suggests that the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings in early 1998 did more to develop 
peace between the PUK and the KDP than other scholars give them credit. Many scholars simply 
don’t mention this endemic peace process, or when they do, they refer to it in passing and laud 
the Washington Agreement as the US bringing an end to the conflict. However, the confidence 
building measures put in place by these bi-weekly meetings did more to establish an atmosphere 
of cooperation towards the establishment of positive peace than the Washington Agreement 
would have been able to do on its own, even with the aid of the US. Not to mention, that the two 
parties were meeting bi-weekly for five months—approximately 10 total meetings, after a series 
of letters traded between their leaders—to negotiate, already establishing a pattern of negotiation 
without interference from other spoiler powers like Turkey.212    
 
Extensive peacetime learning period 
  
My analysis shows that learning during peacetime was as important as the learning that 
took place during conflict. I also argue that two independent variables influence this peacetime 
learning. First, the ambiguity of the agreement language, specifically found in the Washington 
Agreement, set the stage for the two parties to be able to learn more about the arrangements that 
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were necessary and most useful for embedding positive peace in the community. This is in large 
part due to the extensive negotiations which took place between the Kurds from December 1997 
to June1998 (the Koya/Shaqlawa process) which allowed them to select themselves into 
language that would most effectively maintain the peace. Second, by establishing two 
governorates and keeping separate peshmergas the parties stumbled on an effective method for 
preventing further combat. This because the parties were able to avoid the commitment problem 
that stems from disarming in addition to their preoccupation learning how to run an effective 
government.  
 
Strategic Agreement Language 
Literature on power-sharing agreements has examined them as powerful peace-keeping 
measures, given that they ameliorate the commitment problem between two parties of 
approximately equal strength splitting the political power according to the expectations of 
each.213 These studies have focused more on ending conflict (i.e. negative peace) and less on 
institutionalizing peace for the future (positive peace).   
 I argue that during the warfare period the KDP and PUK were able to learn of their true 
parity. I further argue that their endemic peace process, the Koya/Shaqlawa process, allowed 
them to utilize what was learned from their previous agreement about ineffective language such 
that they were able to create a wisely ambiguous agreement that allowed for renegotiation once 
the elites’ incentives allowed for deeper cooperation. This was possible since they were not the 
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subjects of coercive mediation which could have pigeon-holed them into language that was too 
specific and unachievable. 
This ambiguity is a form of the flexibility that Werner and Yuen posit is important to 
ensure that both parties do not feel the need to reignite conflict in the future because they have 
recourse, such as changing circumstances through negotiation.214 For the Kurds, this ambiguous 
agreement language enabled them to deepen their cooperation over the course of several years 
rather than all at once; e.g. the establishment of a joint federal project in 2002,215 opening offices 
in each other’s regions in 2003,216 and participating in the Iraqi elections in 2004 on a joint 
ticket.217 The lengthy deepening of cooperation transformed what had been a negative peace into 
a positive peace, which was institutionalized in the community.   
 
The 50-50 Agreement (1992) 
  The 1992 power sharing agreement had a strict and straight-forward structure in both the 
legislative and executive branches. The 105-seat Kurdistan National Assembly was allocated by 
the agreement, 50 seats for each party, with the remaining five seats given to the minority 
parties. However, plans for future elections for these positions were not made at the time of the 
agreement. 
In the executive branch, in an attempt to be flexible, the ministries were run by both 
parties. Each government department had a minister from one party and a deputy from the other. 
While the minister was intended to have greater power than the deputy, the power dynamics 
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were such that the minister and deputy had equal power which created deadlock over even the 
most menial of decisions.218  
 The election results between Barzani and Talabani for president of the KRG were so slim 
that a second election was deemed necessary; however, they were never held and the office of 
president was never activated, in part because of the refusal of the two leaders to hold second 
elections. Furthermore, the two leaders declined to be involved in the government formed as a 
result of the 50-50 agreement, but they still exerted influence over the ministries. Given that the 
leaders were meddling with decisions made by the ministries for the benefit of their own parties 
and their refusal to engage in the agreement negotiated, the rigidity of the 50-50 Agreement 
created an untenable situation which soon became too brittle to continue to function well.219  
 In addition to its inflexible nature, the 50-50 Agreement had at least one other major 
failure. While the agreement mandated that the parties split their income between them equally, 
it did not cede control of the money to the main government. This omission laid the groundwork 
for the fallout that would ultimately cause the PUK to attack the KDP in 1994.220  
 The 50-50 Agreement was a rudimentary power-sharing agreement, one that did not have 
the flexibility to withstand the tests of change and disagreement. The ministries were deadlocked 
due to the ministers and deputies having equal power and both parties then trying to impose their 
wishes. Thus, without the flexibility to adapt to change, or the willingness of the parties to 
negotiate, the 50-50 Agreement only had the ability to maintain negative peace, the absence of 
conflict, for a short while, stopping a seemingly inevitable conflict for at least two years.  
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The Washington Agreement (1998) 
After the extensive learning period mentioned above, the Washington Agreement solved 
for some of the missteps taken in the creation of the 50-50 Agreement. For instance, the 
Washington Agreement included measures for ongoing discussion and negotiation after the final 
agreement had been signed, building on the Koya/Shaqlawa meetings which took place prior to 
the agreement signing.221 
The structure of the Kurdistan Regional Assembly was to be determined by elections, 
which were mandated, rather than seats apportioned by the agreement. Thus, as political winds 
changed, and party power ebbed and flowed (as demonstrated by the rise of the Gorran party in 
2009)222 the legislature would be the measure of democracy that the Kurds were hoping it to be.  
Ambiguity in the details about the executive branch was also helpful in allowing them to 
create a structure that would work for them. In a post-civil war Kurdistan this was the creation of 
two governorates with separate ministries. This ended up being one of the most effective ways of 
maintaining and institutionalizing the peace in the immediate aftermath of the conflict and 
agreement.223  
Even with this ambiguity of structure, the agreement included measures that would assure 
eventual integration. For instance, there was an initial deadline for reintegration, but even in that 
there was some flexibility. The agreement used phrases such as “on or before” and 
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“beginning”—language which allowed the parties to make changes and work on reintegration in 
a manner and timeframe which was right for both of them, as long as they could point to some 
measure of compliance.224 
In addition to solving for the inflexibility of the 50-50 Agreement, the Washington 
Agreement tried to account for the adequate sharing of revenue through the creation of a single 
minister for revenue and taxation.225 While this part of the agreement was not accomplished 
before the Unification Agreement in 2006, the inclusion in the Washington Agreement shows 
just how effective the conflict was as a learning period for creating a more effective power-
sharing agreement.  
 
Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement (2006) 
 In 2006, the KDP and the PUK determined to reunify their two governorates and in doing 
so renegotiated the Washington Agreement, something that would not necessarily have been a 
possibility after the 50-50 Agreement. The two parties were willing to negotiate because they 
were both trying to gain back some of the reputation they had had with the international 
community prior to 1994, and they were trying to position themselves as the only competent and 
trustworthy leaders in a newly forming Iraq, having successfully run their own region for many 
years. They knew that positioning themselves as a unified front would make both the other Iraqi 
parties and the international arbiters more likely to trust them..226 The Kurdistan Regional 
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Government Unification Agreement is a good example of how ambiguity in the original 
agreement can lead to effective renegotiation that further institutionalizes peace in the region.  
The Unification Agreement not only had the endorsement of both the party leaders, as the 
1998 agreement had, but their full participation.227 In order to assure that the presidency would 
be activated this time, the Unification Agreement created a position of Vice President as part of 
the executive branch.228 Additionally, the ministries were unified under the KRG, with each 
party in charge of approximately half the ministries—the KDP headed 13 ministries and the PUK 
headed 14—each controlling two of the four major ministries, Peshmerga & Finance (KDP), 
Justice and Interior (PUK.)229 And, once again drawing on the experience of the past, there was 
specific language in the agreement which encouraged the preparation of a regional budget within 
one year by the unified KRG.230  
The structure of the KNA remained largely unchanged from the Washington Agreement, 
but the Unification Agreement created a rotating schedule for the positions of Speaker and Prime 
Minister. With every new Assembly, the position of prime minister and speaker were to be from 
different parties.231 The designation of a rotating schedule proved most important because the 
power of the government lies with the prime minister, and for only one party to consistently be in 
control of the most powerful position, could upset the power-sharing agreement as a whole. 
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 Finally, the Unification Agreement created joint committees in each of the governorates 
with members from both the PUK and the KDP.232 The purpose of these committees was to 
provide a venue in each of the governorates for resolving any issues that might arise between the 
parties. This provision of the Unification Agreement again shows that the learning period was 
effective and the language of the agreement was more tailored to increase the institutionalization 
of peace in their community. The Kurds created a full committee which was dedicated toward 
negotiation to settle conflicts that may have arisen in a period of tumult, instead of defaulting to 
conflict.  
The Kurdistan Regional Unification Agreement in 2006 is a compelling piece of evidence 
for the argument that the contents of an agreement actually do make a difference in fostering 
positive peace in a community. The Washington Agreement helped to shape an environment in 
which renegotiation instead of conflict was preferable, in part because of the parties’ explicit 
commitment towards negotiation over fighting in the wake of outside commitments from the US 
to continue to protect the Kurds from Baghdad’s intervention.233 Furthermore, the Unification 
Agreement provided a joint project that enabled the two disparate parties to collaborate in 
building something new—a unified and vastly more functional government—a core tenet of 
positive peace.  
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Importance of Explicit Revenue-Sharing Measures 
 The Kurdish Civil War hinges on one issue more than any other: revenue sharing. In 
1992, the KDP-controlled border with Turkey was providing approximately 85 percent of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government’s revenues, bringing in approximately 150,000 dollars per day 
through taxation of oil trucks and illicit trading.234 The PUK, whose territory bordered Iran, did 
not have the same access to revenue, and it was therefore very important to them that they 
receive a fair portion of the revenue received by the KDP.  
 With this knowledge in mind, the 50-50 Agreement tried to ensure that the KDP was 
sharing this revenue with the PUK through a mandate that the revenue was split 50-50. But it 
was only language in an agreement, and there was no central ministry for finance, or requirement 
that the KRG be put in control of the region’s finances. This lack of structural methods for 
revenue-sharing prevented transparency and thus fostered distrust among the PUK. While the 
KDP assured the PUK that they were receiving their half of the revenue received by the KDP, 
the PUK remained unconvinced. In fact, the major substantive reason the PUK cited for starting 
the conflict in 1994 was that the KDP was withholding revenue. This claim illustrates that in 
addition to mutual optimism for war (the information problem), the PUK was likely also fearing 
the KDP’s steady increase in power over time if the revenue sharing was not reformed (the 
commitment problem.)  
 Having fought a war which revealed to both sides that they were rather evenly matched, 
the Washington Agreement included explicit measures for revenue sharing. First it was 
established that the Higher Coordination Committee (HCC)—a committee established to oversee 
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the reconciliation between the parties—would oversee the flow of funds between the two parties 
while an interim government was selected. Then, the responsibility of collecting and distributing 
the revenue in the region would be delegated to a single Ministry of Revenue and Taxation 
which would do so at the direction of the Kurdistan National Assembly.235  
 Although the measures put in place in the Washington Agreement were not enacted 
before 2006 due to the choice to administer two separate governorates between 1998 and 2006, 
the lessons learned between 1998 and 2006 allowed for an even better, more specific 
arrangement for finances in 2006. This included specifics as to who and how the budget should 
be prepared—by the Kurdistan Regional Government approved by the Kurdistan National 
Assembly—as well as how revenue allocation was to be administered between the parties.236 
 On the whole, the two periods of learning engrained in the two parties how important 
specificity and transparency in the arrangements for revenue sharing were for the maintenance 
and institutionalization of peace. It was only through the two learning periods, the first after the 
50-50 Agreement, when a shoddy revenue-sharing arrangement ultimately led to fighting, and 
the second after the Washington Agreement, that the two parties could reach an arrangement that 
was satisfactory to both parties. Revenue-sharing was the main grievance which launched the 
two parties into violence in 1994, so finding a solution to prevent a similar resurgence of this 
grievance is crucial for developing a long-standing, positive peace.  
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Two Governorates, Two Peshmergas—How post-1998 administrative style set the Iraqi Kurds up 
for Peace and Governing Success 
Stansfield has noted previously that keeping two governorates was an inadvertently 
genius way to not only keep the peace, but provide a sort of school for developing double the 
number of experienced civil servants than would otherwise have been available.237 Separate 
governorates themselves did have some level of effectiveness in the preservation of the peace 
because both parties were focused on providing services to the populations under their control, 
and in this case that took nearly all the concentration of the two parties to learn how to govern 
effectively because they had never had this opportunity before.238 However, Stansfield’s analysis 
does not allow for two circumstances.  
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Figure 3: Map of KDP and PUK Governorates, 2003239 
 
First, Stansfield does not discuss how effective keeping the peshmergas separate and 
supporting each party was in promoting peace. Civil wars are generally prolonged due to a 
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commitment problem on the part of the weaker party. They fear that should they surrender their 
military the ruling party will immediately renege on the agreement that has been made. Because 
this is a civil war, the issue of party militaries needs to be addressed. Before the 50-50 
Agreement, the two parties were not engaged in a civil war with each other, instead they were 
involved in parallel civil wars with the Iraqi government.  
When initial power-sharing government was created, the issue of peshmerga control was 
not discussed as part of the arrangements. Although, there had been some rumors of peshmerga 
unification as early 1991, these seemed half-hearted, and commitments were never made.240 The 
unwillingness from all parties to cede military control could reflect their wariness of each of the 
other Kurdish parties which was only overwhelmed by their strong desire to create an 
autonomous region. But the fact that peshmerga unification was not a serious part of the 
conversation in 1992 meant that they were prepared and somewhat primed to fight when they 
were unable to resolve a disagreement about revenue through negotiation in 1994.  
At the close of the conflict, the Washington Agreement did address, to a certain degree, 
the unification of peshmerga. The commitment was once again half-hearted, and left mostly up 
to the discretion of the parties. However, in implementation, a unified peshmerga was not 
pursued, and as a result of keeping their separate militaries, the Kurds stumbled onto a 
particularly effective way of maintaining the peace: ending the conflict like an interstate war. 
Even at the end of the conflict, the PUK and the KDP were so well matched that there 
wasn’t a “weaker” party to disband their troops, as we would expect in a civil war situation. 
Instead, each party kept their own peshmergas which became an insurance measure against the 
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other party.241 Thus, the Kurdish Civil War ended in a way that mirrored the end of an interstate 
conflict between minor parties. Each military supported one of the two distinct governorates that 
blossomed after the signing of the Washington Agreement giving the parties the ability to ensure 
compliance with the agreement through violent means, if necessary. 
 While keeping separate peshmergas was an unexpectedly effective way of maintaining 
peace between the two parties, so was the unwritten agreement to divide the territory into two 
separately run governorates, the PUK administering Sulaymaniyah and territories to the east, and 
the KDP administering Erbil and territories to the north. The only thread connecting them was 
the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) which was not especially active during the period when 
the governorates were administered separately.242  
Second, Stansfield argues that while separate governorates preserved the peace, he did 
not see a circumstance where there could be unification.243 However, he wrote this analysis in 
2003 before the increased talks between the PUK and KDP in the wake of the US invasion of 
Iraq and the new discussion about the future of Iraq, a discussion in which both parties wanted a 
part. In some small part, the separate governorates were a byproduct of a more flexible 
agreement, one that enabled the parties to have an additional learning period about their 
capabilities and the skills required to administer a semi-democratic region.  
In the wake of the Washington Agreement, having two governorates both distracted each 
party from fighting in the near term and in the long term enabled both parties to train people in 
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the practice of running a government.244 Thus, when the time was right to renegotiate, after the 
2003 invasion shifted internal political equations, there were people who were trained in the 
process of running a government.  
In 1992, the Kurds had never run a democratic government, nor had they really ever had 
a government of their own. So, the way they chose to build a government was based to a certain 
extent on what they had observed in other countries, or read about. The learning period from 
1998-2005 for both parties to grasp the mechanics and difficulties that came with running a 
government responsible for providing goods and services—and therefore accountable to—a 
population was of paramount importance for the two parties. It enabled them to better plan for 
reunification when the time came to do so in 2006.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 My analysis of conflict and peace in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from 1991 to 2006, 
shows that both of the competing scholarships on peace—institutionalist camp and the selection 
camp—have some power in explaining the conflict between the PUK and the KDP, both camps 
bringing part of the solution for lasting peace. The selection camp demonstrates that lasting 
peace is more likely when the two parties agree on the outcomes possible, and demonstrate it 
through the agreement language leading to negative peace in the very least. The institutionalist 
camp demonstrates that the strategic choice of language is powerful in enabling negative peace 
to flourish. Both of these camps together explain more positive peace or greater cooperation in 
the community.   
 I show that power-sharing agreements, when informed by the context in which they must 
function have great power towards fostering the cooperation necessary for achieving positive 
peace. The Kurdish case allows us to examine this through the three agreements which we have 
to study, each of which demonstrates the tangible institutionalization of peace, or lack thereof, in 
the community. 
In 1992, the Kurds were largely naïve about the way that a government should function. 
They were building democratic structures from the ground up with little aid from more 
established democratic powers, and even less personal experience in running a government. This 
led to some avoidable, but certainly understandable mistakes. First that the 50-50 Agreement was 
not flexible enough to deal with changes that would inevitably come. Second, neither party truly 
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trusted the evidence of popularity provided by the elections in part because they had no 
experience with them.  
With their history of nearly 20 years of internecine animosity, and a background in 
fighting for power with the government in Baghdad, experience taught them that conflict was the 
only way to identify a top power. Their mutual optimism for success was quickly banished 
through the conflict, which served as a learning period during which the parties learned two 
things.  
First, that they were evenly matched in every respect no matter who was backing them. 
Having not fought one another before this was an important lesson to learn. Second, that when 
they were establishing a regional government and not fighting Baghdad, their external backers 
had ulterior motives which did not necessarily match the motives of the Kurdish parties. As a 
result, their external backers were acting more as spoilers for the peace process than as aids. 
Without the conflict, it is unlikely that the parties could have learned that particular piece of 
information as well or as quickly. 
The Koya/Shaqlawa process and ultimately the Washington Agreement demonstrate that 
the two parties had learned something from the previous agreement as well as their conflict. The 
endemic Koya/Shaqlawa process enabled the parties to reach understandings for creating 
agreement language which enabled a lasting peace agreement. So, while it had concrete goals, 
the Washington Agreement did not try to mandate how the executive was structured which 
meant that the parties had the flexibility to arrive at an arrangement, through further negotiation, 
which suited both of them. In this case, they established separate governorates and kept their 
militaries, inadvertently stumbling on a particularly effective method of avoiding the 
commitment problem in civil wars because both parties had a method to enforce compliance with 
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the major pieces of the agreement such as revenue sharing and the commitment not to support 
the PKK. 
For eight years, the Washington Agreement’s ambiguity and the subsequent creation of 
two separately administered governorates provided double benefits. First, the two parties were so 
focused on providing adequate goods and services to those under their rule that they were 
distracted from fighting one another. Second, twice as many people were trained in bureaucracy 
and democratic-esque structures so that when unification came, there were many qualified 
people to be able to fill the roles necessary in a region that had once had not a single experienced 
bureaucrat.  
Finally, the Kurdistan Regional Unification Agreement of 2006 shows us just how well 
the Koya/Shaqlawa process and Washington Agreement set the Kurdistan Region up for deeper 
cooperation and positive peace between the KDP and the PUK when incentives changed for their 
leaders after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The lessons learned from 1992 again appear in this 
agreement, the division of the ministries is more flexible, and there is better division of the 
ministries between the parties providing an escape from the bureaucratic deadlock that came 
from the division made in the 50-50 Agreement. But perhaps the most meaningful steps towards 
positive peace was the establishment of joint committees in each governorate which were meant 
to provide a place to negotiate disagreements between members of each party.  
Not only did the Unification Agreement bring two parties together to work in a functional 
government after decades of animosity, but they were aware of the possible friction that 
unification might cause even then and provided a way for diffusing the conflicts without 
resorting to violence. While the two parties are still at odds with one another, the cooperation 
between then runs deep and that is evident through these three power-sharing agreements.  
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This thesis demonstrates the influence of context-driven power-sharing agreements for 
developing, establishing, and institutionalizing positive peace in communities which may have 
been involved in heated internecine conflicts for long periods of time.  
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APPENDIX I: TIMELINE OF THE KURDS IN IRAQ 1940-2009 
 
 
Year Month Day Event 
1940 
1941 
  
Hiwa (Hope) party established in Iraq, Mulla Mustafa Barzani placed 
under house arrest for revolutionary activities245 
1943 
  
Mulla Mustafa Barzani escapes house arrest, and foments the Barzani 
Rebellion246 
1945 
  
Hiwa party collapses, Barzani Rebellion collapses, Mulla Mustafa 
exiled to Iran247 
1945 9 
 
Qazi Mohammad, leader of the Iranian Kurds, established Kurdish 
Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I)248  
1945 12 15 Kurdish Republic of Mahabad declared in Iran249 
1946 8 16 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) established in Iraq, Mulla Mustafa 
elected president in absentia.250  
1946 12 
 
Mahabad Republic falls, Mulla Mustafa and best troops forced to 
withdraw to the Soviet Union “Retreat of the Five Hundred"251  
1950 
1951 
  
Ibrahim Ahmed elected secretary general of KDP, beginning of 
divisions between KDP politburo (erudite, intelligentsia) and the 
conservative Barzani faction.252 
1958 10 
 
Mulla Mustafa returns to Iraq from Soviet Union at invitation of 
Abdul Karim Qassim, new president of Iraq253 
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xcvii
1960 
1961 9 9 Iraqi government begins air bombardment of Kurdistan254 
1961 
  
Revolution of 1961 launches longest and most sustained period of 
military and political engagement in the history of Kurdish movements 
also called the War of Liberation255 
1963 
  
Revolution of 1961, second Kurdistan war comes to an end with 
Qassim's ouster256 
1964 
  
Division of the Kurdistan Democratic Party along ideological lines, 
left-wing (Ibrahim Ahmad [Jalal Talabani’s Father-in-law]) versus the 
establishment (Mullah Mustafa Barzani)257 
1965 
  
Ceasefire between Baghdad and Kurdistan comes to an end. Spring 
offensive against the Kurds, Third Kurdistan War begins258 
1966 6 15 Third Kurdistan War comes to an end259 
1968 7 17 Revolution in Baghdad brings Ba'athists to power260 
1969 4 
 
Baghdad launches Fourth Kurdistan War261 
1970 
1970 3 11 Baghdad approaches Kurds to build a peace agreement, resulting in 
the March Manifesto (March Agreement)262  
1974 3 11 Iraq instigates Law of Autonomy (Act 33 of 1974), Kurds refuse to 
comply and fight the Fifth Kurdistan War263 
1975 3 
 
Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran results in loss of Iranian 
support for Kurds, Kurdish Front collapses.264  
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xcviii
1975 3 
 
KDP splinters into several groups, including the Provisional 
Command KDP led by Barzani's sons and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan organized by Jalal Talabani, Ahmed's protégé.265  
  
1978 11 27 PKK formed in Turkey266 
1979 3 
 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani dies in U.S. where he had been treated for 
cancer.267 
1980 
1980 
  
Iran-Iraq war begins268 
1982 
  
Popular Kurdish uprising269 
1983 
  
PUK agrees to collaborate w/ Saddam, signs autonomy agreement, in 
an effort to stop KDP's coordinated attacks with the Iranians270 
1983 
  
KDP renews military struggle against Ba’athists during the Iran-Iraq 
War271 
1983 
  
PKK and KDP sign Principles of Solidarity, KDP grants PKK access 
to territory and joint use of infrastructure272 
1983 
  
PUK + KDP-I vs. KDP + Iran273 
1984 
  
Principles of Solidarity made public274 
1984 
  
Popular Kurdish uprising275 
1985 
  
Popular Kurdish uprising276 
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xcix
1986 
  
Iran mediates agreement between Talabani and Barzani, agreement 
signed by Jalal Talabani & Idris Mustafa Barzani (son of Mullah 
Mustafa) agreement shaky after Idris passes away in Jan 1987. Lays 
the groundwork for the Kurdistan Front.277  
1987 
  
Popular Kurdish uprising278 
1987 
  
Ali Hassan al-Majid declared absolute ruler of the north by 
Baghdad279 
1987 7 
 
Establishment of Kurdistan Front which did not truly unite the 
Kurdish parties because each was looking out for their own interests, 
but did prevent them from fighting each other280  
1988 2 
 
Anfal Campaigns begin281 
1988 3 
 
Halabja Massacre282 
1988 5 
 
IKF formally established283 
1988 8 26 UNSC resolution 620 condemning chemical weapons use by Iraqi 
government284 
1988 9 
 
Anfal Campaigns end285 
1990 
1990 
  
US encourages Kurdish uprising against Saddam intimating support 
but does not follow through.286  
1991 4 6 Operation Provide Comfort begins (Operation Poised Hammer—the 
military component). Establishment of no fly-zone287 
1991 4 8 OPC expanded to a combined joint task force to recognize 
international cooperation288 
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c
1991 4 15 UNSC Resolution 688289 
1991 4 17 Task Force Encourage Hope (part of OPC) launched to construct a 
series of resettlement camps where dislocated civilians found food, 
shelter, and a secure environment.290 
1991 5 19 UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) UN forces based in Iraq to 
protect the UN humanitarian missions in Iraq, involved soldiers from 
35 different countries.291  
1991 6 7 Humanitarian relief efforts taken over by the UNHCR292 
1992 
  
Links between PKK and Baghdad through the early 1990s comes to 
light. PKK gave Baghdad intel on Iraqi Kurds293 
1992 5 19 First general election and establishment of 1st KRG government, 105 
elected members of the Kurdistan National Assembly (later renamed 
the parliament). Turnout 90% of eligible voters. Results favored the 
KDP294 
1992 5 
 
PUK refuses to accept results of the general election295 
1992 
  
50-50 Agreement between KDP and PUK to avoid civil war296 
1992 7 24 PKK puts embargo on trade between Turkey and northern Iraq297 
1992 10 16 Turkey launches attack on PKK298 
1992 10 21 
 
 
 PUK, & KDP (IKF) join Turkish attack on PKK299 
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ci
1992 10 30 PKK surrenders to IKF, specifically PUK300 
1993 
  
Iran on good terms with both Iraqi Kurdish parties, consulates in both 
regions301 
1993 
  
Parties fall out over division of oil revenues (PUK suspicious the KDP 
was hoarding the money earned from oil smuggling through the KDP 
controlled territory into Turkey) and also concerns over control of the 
major cities. Particularly that PUK had control of Erbil where the 
assembly met.302  
1993 3 
 
Brief unilateral cease-fire between PKK and Turkey303 
1994 5 1 Tensions reach their height between KDP and PUK. Due to land 
disputes over area northeast of Sulaymaniyah, fighting begins.304 
1994 5 3 KDP takes Dohuk, Zakho and Ammadiya from PUK305 
1994 6 1 First round fighting ends, more than 400 killed in the month. Second 
round clashes begin.306  
1994 6 5 More than 600 people killed in second round clashes between PUK 
and KDP307 
1994 7 4 KDP and PUK announce that they are still unified against the Iraqi 
Government308 
1994 7 16 France hosts peace talks in Paris (brokered by US and UK), two weeks 
of negotiation, parties reach an agreement, have to wait on approval 
from party leaders (Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani)309 
1994 7 19 PUK and KDP Clash sporadically until August 18310 
                                               
300 Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 31; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International 
Relations, 183; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.” 
301 Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey: Temporary Marriage?,” 97; Entessar, “The Kurdish Factor in Iran-Iraq 
Relations,” 2. 
302 Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 223–24; 
Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 48; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Černy, Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations, 190; Gunter, “The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq,” 233. 
303 Gunter, “Kurdish Disunity in Historical Perspective,” 31. 
304 Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 223; Yildiz, 
The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 48; “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, 
the PKK and International Relations, 190; Gunter, “The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq,” 233. 
305 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Gürbey, Hofmann, and Seyder, Between State and Non-State: Politics and 
Society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine, 237. 
306 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline”; Černy, Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations, 190. 
307 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.” 
308 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.” 
309 Waisy, “The Roots of the Iraqi Kurdish Internal Rivalries, Conflicts and Peace Process 1964-2000,” 223; Yildiz, 
The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 48–49. 
310 “Iraqi Kurdistan Profile - Timeline.” 
 
                                                                                                      
 
cii
1994 7 22 Paris peace talks conclude, because visas were not allowed by Turkey 
and the agreement died311 
1994 8 15 Talabani and Barzani sign agreement in official KNA meeting, lasts 
less than 72 hours312 
1994 8 18 Sporadic clashes between PUK and KDP end for a time313 
1994 11 23 "Alliance pact” or “Year 2000 agreement" both parties agree not to 
fight again until the year 2000, agreement did not last even until the 
end of the month. PUK captures village of Kasnazan near Erbil, and 
then retake Erbil by the end of 1994314  
1994 12 13 Fights break out between PUK and KDP over disputes in tax 
collection315 
1995 
  
PUK supports the  PKK, which had previously clashed with the 
KDP316 
1995 1 1 PUK and KDP fight, after the worst of it, PUK takes Erbil317 
1995 2 17 Informal cease fire between PUK and KDP ends fighting which began 
1/1/95318 
1995 2 20 Heavy fighting between PUK and KDP begins319 
1995 2 22 Heavy fighting between PUK and KDP ends320  
1995 3 20 Turkish army launches major incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan on the eve 
of the Kurdish New Year Nowruz, Operation Steel321 
1995 3 27 PUK and KDP clash for 24 hours, at least 100 killed322 
1995 4 8 KDP calls for temporary truce w/ PUK, brokered by Turkey323 
1995 4 14 Oil for Food program in Iraq established324 
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ciii
1995 5 4 Operation Steel ends, Turkey withdraws325 
1995 5 27 Over two days, PUK and KDP meet on neutral ground to extend KNA 
mandate for another year326 
1995 7 4 Turkey invades Kurdistan to attack PKK positions in the country327 
1995 7 8 PUK launches preemptive attack against KDP, rationalizing through 
asserting the KDP would have launched an attack within a short 
time328 
1995 7 11 Turkish invasion concludes329 
1995 8 11 Initial Drogheda talk begin brokered by US (Turkey and UK also 
involved)330 
1995 8 15 PUK and KDP at US brokered talks in Dublin, Ireland reach an 
agreement to demilitarize Erbil, turn over by the KDP of customs 
revenues to joint bank account and reconvening of KRG331 
1995 8 26 PKK attacks KDP to break up peace talks between PUK and KDP332 
1995 9 12 Drogheda talks resume, attempt to mediate full agreement based on 
progress made in August talks333 
1995 9 15 Peace talks in Ireland conclude without agreement334 
1995 10 
 
Iran brokered peace talks between KDP and PUK in Tehran, 
supposedly reach some agreement, but details are scarce and 
inconclusive335 
1995 11 13 US sponsored peace talks resume336 
1995 11 21 US sponsored peace talks conclude again without reaching 
settlement.337  
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civ
1996 
  
Mediation led by Turkey in the presence of the UK & US–produces 
Ankara declaration which had 22 articles. Only 5 of which KDP 
accepted. PUK accepted all.338  
1996 4 18 US State dept official Robert Deutsch travels to Northern Iraq to try to 
broker a settlement339  
1996 5 29 PUK and KDP officials agree to extend the term of the assembly of 
the power-sharing agreement340 
1996 7 16 US petitions sides to stop fighting, again did not hold341 
1996 7 
 
PUK allows Iranian troops to go after Iranian Kurds which had been 
using their bases in the area in return for the support of the Iranian 
government.342  
1996 8 
 
Operation Provide Comfort ends, US withdraws personnel, NGO 
employees343 
1996 8 16 PUK breaks year-long armistice, attacks KDP, giving KDP reason to 
turn to Saddam for support. Engage in the most serious fighting since 
ceasefire in 1995344 
1996 8 22 Barzani asks Saddam to send Iraqi National guards to help take back 
Erbil345 
1996 8 28 PUK and KDP agree to new US brokered cease fire and work towards 
more comprehensive settlement346 
1996 8 31 Iraqi help arrives and the KDP quashes the PUK, taking back control 
of Erbil347 
1996 9 4 KDP declares amnesty for PUK members who want to return to their 
homes if they sign a declaration of surrender and pay "caution 
money"348  
1996 9 9 KDP takes Sulaymaniyah from PUK349 
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1996 10 
 
Ankara Process (US, Turkey and Iran broker) denounced by Iran350 
1996 10 13 PUK takes back Sulaymaniyah with Iranian support + two other 
towns351 
1996 10 23 Ceasefire and the 10-point agreement (US, Turkey, Kurds) Peace 
monitoring force implemented352 
1997 1 1 Operation Northern Watch begins353 
1997 1 16 Ankara process resumes, but KDP official is killed and the KDP pulls 
out. Note: in all negotiations the KDP wanted Erbil as the center of 
power which benefited them politically and PUK did not want that 
because they no longer had any control over Erbil354  
1997 3 11 Murder of local KDP leader leads to temporary breakdown of peace 
talks between KDP and PUK. PUK denies responsibility for the 
killing355 
1997 5 
 
Turkish Army signs agreement with the KDP to patrol Iraq/Turkey 
border356 
1997 5 14 50,000 Turkish troops invade Iraq to support KDP and against the 
PKK (Operation Sledgehammer)357  
1997 7 10 PUK withdraws from Ankara Process358 
1997 8 
 
PUK has increased relationships with Iraqi Central government to 
secure its position359 
1997 9 
 
Fighting between PKK and KDP results in considerable losses for 
KDP360 
1997 9 23 Turkish army in cooperation with the KDP attacked the PUK: 
"Operation Twilight"361  
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1997 10 
 
After PUK makes significant gains, Turkey intervenes on the KDP's 
side362  
1997 10 13 Turkey announces end of Operation Twilight, PUK launches military 
campaign "Storm of Revenge" against KDP on the heels of Turkish 
withdrawal.363  
1997 10 18 After fighting for 5 days, PUK and KDP agree to US brokered 
ceasefire. Signing of the agreement is followed by some skirmishes in 
which members of both sides killed.364  
1997 11 24 Fighting continues between PUK and KDP, but KDP declares 
unilateral cease-fire365 
1997 11 
 
Relationship between Turkey and KDP strengthens366 
1997 12 
 
Talabani and Barzani exchange letters leading to a series of meetings 
to discuss normalization measures, Koya-Shaqlawa meetings367 
1998 2 12 PUK and KDP start talks including confidence building measures, 
ceasefire enforcement, release of prisoners and establishment of joint 
committee to ensure implementation of SCR 986. PUK and KDP 
working out lower level concerns first, meeting every two weeks.  
Koya-Shaqlawa meetings368 
1998 6 
 
Talks between PUK and KDP deadlock over main issues, parties stop 
meeting as frequently369 
1998 7 20 US invites leaders of PUK and KDP to US for negotiations on a final, 
comprehensive peace settlement. David Walsh (State dept) goes to 
regions to issue invitations370 
1998 9 
 
As a sign of good faith, PUK and KDP exchange more than 200 
prisoners from conflict371 
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1998 9 17 Peace agreement reached, brokered by US. Called the Washington 
agreement. Post-civil war there were two seats of executive power 
KDP administered in Erbil, PUK administered from Sulaymaniyah. 
After PUK makes significant gains, Turkey intervenes on the KDP's 
side372 
1998 
  
Turkey monitors situation after US brokers Washington Agreement373 
1998 10 
 
PKK fighters move back to Iraqi Kurdistan straining Washington 
Agreement.374  
1999 1 8 Leaders of the Iraqi Kurdish factions meet in northern Iraq to discuss 
implementation of the peace plan375 
1999 2 16 Turkey captures Ocalan, leader of the PKK376 
1999 4 16 Masoud Barzani accuses PUK of helping PKK in breach of 
agreement377  
1999 6 
 
PUK holds KDP responsible for non-implementation of the 
agreement378  
2000 
2000 6 10 Turkish and US embassy officials visit Iraqi Kurdistan. At this time 
PUK and KDP reaffirm commitment to Washington Agreement379 
2000 6 26 Kurdish officials meet with vice president Al Gore in Washington380 
2000 7 25 Talabani meets with Turkish PM, in the Turkish capital381 
2000 9 14 PUK and PKK fight382 
2000 10 
 
Masoud Barzani meets with Turkish officials383 
2000 11 21 Barham Sali (Head of PUK govt) meets with U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld384 
2000 12 3 PUK and PKK fight again.385  
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2000 
  
KDP/ Turkey relations cool386 
2002 4 
 
Secret meeting between Barzani, Talabani, and President George W. 
Bush; PUK and KDP set up a "joint operation room" to deal with 
terrorism in the region387 
2002 6 
 
PUK, KDP join talks with other Iraqi groups about the future of Iraq in 
the event of a US-led military intervention388  
2002 8 15 Talabani publicly issues invitation for US/UK to invade Iraq from 
PUK's territory389 
2002 9 23 PUK and KDP publish draft of joint federal project, draws warning 
from Turks390 
2002 10 5 Kurdistan National Assembly resumes, both parties participate391 
2002 11 7 Draft constitution for Iraqi accepted in the regional assembly392 
2003 
  
Operation Northern Watch ends393 
2003 2 8 KDP and PUK open offices in each other's regions as a sign of 
reconciliation394 
2003 2 15 KDP and PUK declare intention to join the US invasion forces in the 
anticipated war against Iraq395 
2003 3 20 US invasion of Iraq, been crucial in the endeavor to normalize 
relations between the 2 KRG administrations396 
2003 4 9 Join US and Kurdish troops take over Mosul and Kirkuk397 
2003 5 
 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) created398 
2003 7 13 Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) formed399 
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2003 11 21 Oil for food and UNGCI terminated400 
2004 
  
CPA passes law of administration for the state of Iraq in the 
transitional period, recognized the KRG as a federal region of Iraq by 
legalization all its institutions built since 1992401 
2004 3 8 New Iraqi Governing council signs a provisional constitution (the 
Transitional Administrative Law, TAL)402  
2004 6 1 IGC dissolved, Interim Iraqi Government introduced403 
2004 6 8 UNSC resolution 1546 adopted, endorsing formation of interim 
government in Iraq404 
2004 12 1 PUK and KDP leaders sign agreement in which both agree to 
participate in the Iraqi elections as allies. Parties run on a joint ticket in 
Iraqi elections of 2004405 
2005 
  
Permanent Iraqi Constitution written and ratified, maintained existence 
of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)406 
2005 1 30 KNA elections held, same day as Iraqi Elections in which PUK and 
KDP participated as a united election list: Kurdistan Alliance407 
2005 1 31 Barzani elected president of KRG, informal referendum on 
independence for Iraqi Kurdistan conducted408  
2005 10 15 Iraqi Constitution passed409 
2006 1 21 Kurdistan Parliament reaches an agreement to reunify the divided 
KRG administration410 
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2006 5 7 Nechirvan Barzani announces formation of unified KRG411 
2006 5 20 al-Maliki's cabinet approved, Iraqi government formed412 
 
Timeline Color Key:  
  PKK-Turkey involvement in PUK-KDP fight 
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